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I. INTRODUCTION
For roughly a century and a half in United States legal history, territo-
rial theory supplied largely uncontroversial solutions to problems in choice-
of-law. For torts, it was the law of the place of injury; for contracts, the law
of the place where a contract was made or was to be performed. Disputes
involving real property were uniformly referred to the law of the state in
which the property was situated, and those involving personalty to the law of
the state where the owner was domiciled.
So sovereign-seeming were the states of the United States during this
period that these handful of simple rules had about them the aura of ineluc-
tability. Each state had its own distinct legal system, absolute within its
territorial boundaries. These systems had much in common, but there were
differences, often significant ones, and when these differences came to focus
in the occasional conflict-of-laws case, it seemed natural to resolve them by
reference to the law of.the state where legally significant events occurred.!
* Associate Professor of Law, Florida State University; J.D., University of Wisconsin
1966; B.S., United States Military Academy, 1956.
1. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland & Jerry J. Waxman, Florida's Approach to Choice-of-
Law Problems in Tort, 12 FLA. ST. U. L. RFv. 447,453-55 (1984).
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The only debatable question-usually more of theoretical than practical
importance-was why, exactly, a court with complete power to decide a case
would use another state's law rather than its own. To Joseph Story, who
spoke for the nineteenth century, the answer lay in comity-the deference
and respect that one sovereign state owed to the law making power of
another.2 To Joseph Beale, who tried to cement territorial theory for all time
in the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws, the answer was one of obliga-
tion. One state applied the laws of another because it had to. Legal rights
and liabilities came into existence in the first instance only by virtue of the
law of some place; once created under that law, they were fixed and could
thereafter be enforced in some other place only in the form of their creation.3
Real dissatisfaction with territorial principles began to manifest itself in
the first third of this century.4 " Against a backdrop of monumental change in
the larger society, territoriality and the results it dictated grew increasingly
unpalatable to judges striving to do justice in individual cases and no longer
overawed by notions of sovereignty.5 The result was the well known and
still on-going choice-of-law revolution-a pattern of decision making in
which territorial rules were first avoided and then gradually, starting in the
1960s, rejected outright in a growing number of states for one or another of
2. See J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 23-25, 32-38 (photo.
reprint 1972) (1st ed. 1834).
3. See 3 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS § 71, app. at 1964-65
(1935); see also ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OFLAWS 8 (3d ed. 1981):
Mr. Justice Story's "comity" theory held that the forum was free to do as it
wished; the forum, for reasons of practical convenience or moral obligation,
might often permit foreign law to operate.... To Professor Beale and other
vested-rights theorists, "comity" was a fighting word. The term itself implied
that the court possessed an undesirable degree of discretion concerning the appli-
cable law, and the principle violated their view of the territorial premise. Thus
the vested-rights approach stressed a legal obligation to recognize rights based on
foreign law: "A right having been created by the appropriate law, the recognition
of its existence should follow everywhere. Thus an act valid where done cannot
be called in question anywhere."
Id (quoting BEALE, supra at 1969).
4. See, e.g., Walter W. Cook, The Logical and Legal Bases of the Conflict of Laws, 33
Yale L.J. 457 (1924); Ernest G. Lorenzen, Territoriality, Public Policy, and the Conflict of
Laws, 43 Yale L.J. 736 (1924); Hessel E. Yntema, The Hornbook Method and the Conflict of
Laws, 37 Yale L.J. 468 (1928).
5. See, e.g., Harold P. Southerland, A Screaming Comes Across the Sky--Tort Choice-of-
Law Doctrine in Florida Under the Second Restatement of Conflicts, 40 MERCER L. REV. 781,
787-90 (1989).
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the so-called modem approaches. 6 So much has been made of this revolu-
tion and the new learning it embodies that it is possible to lose sight of an
important point. Most of the pressure for change was felt in just two areas-
in torts primarily and, to a somewhat lesser extent, in contracts. 7
In all this, the Florida experience has been typical. Territorial theory
fell as naturally to hand here as elsewhere, rationalized repeatedly in over a
century's worth of opinions in the language of comity-a beneficial exercise
in that deference and respect that one sovereign state owes the law-making
power of another.8 In 1967, in a wrongful death case arising out of the crash
of a commercial airliner,9 the Supreme Court of Florida moved to align itself
with the modem approach for tort cases then being pioneered by the New
York Court of Appeals, 10 but on rehearing, it reconsidered and reversed
itself.1" Thirteen years later, in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.,12 the
court took this step. It discarded lex loci delicti, the inflexible place-of-
injury rule, and replaced it with the most significant relationship approach of
the Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws. After Bishop, it seemed
probable that the venerable lex loci contractus doctrine for contracts cases
would be the next to go, discarded and replaced with a modem approach, the
obvious candidate being the Second Restatement. But when the opportunity
squarely presented itself in 1988 in Sturiano v. Brooks, 3 the court declined
to make the change.
Sturiano involved an automobile insurance contract. The Sturianos,
husband and wife, were lifelong residents of New York and had insured their
6. See, e.g., Harold L. Kom, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: A Critique, 83 COLUM. L.
REv. 772, 802-20 (1983).
7. See, e.g., id. at 775-76.
8. See, e.g., Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d 12, 16 (Fla. 1984) (Shaw, J., dissenting);
Mobil Oil Corp. v. Shevin, 354 So. 2d 372, 375 (Fla. 1977); Gillen v. United Serv. Auto.
Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3, 6 (Fla. 1974); Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743, 746
(Fla. 1967); Beverly Beach Properties, Inc. v. Nelson, 68 So. 2d 604, 609 (Fla. 1953);
Markham v. Nisbet, 60 So. 2d 393, 394 (Fla. 1952); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton,
199 So. 50, 54 (Fla. 1940); Beckwith v. Bailey, 161 So. 576, 581 (Fla. 1935); Hartford
Accident & Indemnity Co. v. City of Thomasville, 130 So. 7, 8 (Fla. 1930); Mott v. First Nat'l
Bank, 124 So. 36, 37 (Fla. 1929); Herron v. Passailaigue, 110 So. 539, 542 (Fla. 1926);
Warren v. Warren, 75 So. 35, 44-45 (Fla. 1917); Walters & Walker v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86, 96
(1860); Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555, 559 (Fla. 1856).
9. Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
10. See Babcock v. Jackson, 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963); see also Southerland & Wax-
man, supra note 1, at 536-42.
11. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 749.
12. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
13. 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988).
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car there. At some point after the policy was issued and without notice to
their insurer, they began to spend the winter months each year in Florida.
While in Florida Mr. Sturiano negligently caused an automobile accident in
which he was killed and his wife injured. She brought suit in Florida against
her husband's estate to recover under the policy. Under New York law, her
claim was barred because the Sturianos had not elected coverage for claims
between spouses as required by New York statute. Florida law had no
corresponding provision. 14 The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed a
jury verdict in Mrs. Sturiano's favor, holding that New York law controlled
because the contract of insurance had been made there.' 5 The court then
certified the question whether lex loci contractus should continue to be the
conflicts rule in Florida, precluding consideration of "OTHER RELEVANT
FACTORS, SUCH AS THE SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN
FLORIDA AND THE PARTIES AND/OR THE TRANSACTION?
' 16
In a majority opinion by Justice Kogan, the supreme court answered the
certified question affirmatively, though expressly limiting itself to automo-
bile insurance contracts.1 7 The court recognized that lex loci contractus was
"inflexible" and that it had been replaced in other states by modem ap-
proaches.' 8 But it was just this inflexibility that ensured "stability in
contract arrangements;"'
' 9
Although lex loci contractus is old, it is not yet out-
dated.... Parties have a right to know what the agreement they
have executed provides. To allow one party to modify the contract
simply by moving to another state would substantially restrict the
power to enter into valid, binding, and stable contracts. There can
be no doubt that the parties to insurance contracts bargained and
paid for the provisions in the agreement, including those provisions
that apply the statutory law of that state.
... In the case of an insurance contract, the parties enter into
that contract with the acknowledgment that the laws of that juris-
diction control their actions. In essence, that jurisdiction's laws are
incorporated by implication into the agreement. The parties to this
14. Id. at 1127, 1129. See MCKINNEY, N.Y. INSURANCE LAW § 3420(g) (McKinney ed.,
1985).
15. Brooks v. Sturiano, 497 So. 2d 976, 979 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), aff'd, 523 So.
2d 1126 (Fla. 1988).
16. Id. at 979.
17. Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126, 1129 (Fla. 1988).
18. Id.
19. Id.
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contract did not bargain for Florida or any other state's laws to
control. We must presume that the parties did bargain for, or at
least expected, New York law to apply.20
In the course of the opinion Justice Kogan quoted in its entirety section 188
of the Second Restatement, conceding that its view was "seemingly the trend
of courts around the nation., 2' But it failed, he said, "to adequately provide
security to the parties to a contract.,
22
Justice Grimes concurred in a separate opinion, joined by Justice
Overton, in which he argued for adoption of the Second Restatement
approach. '"The emerging consensus, [he said], even in cases involving
questions of contract validity, is to apply the most significant relationship
test of section 188 of the Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws
(1971)."23 He continued:
Because contractual disputes arise in such a great variety of set-
tings, rules of broad application cannot do justice to the various
interests and expectations involved. While the application of the
significant relationship test may be less certain, it reflects a more
realistic standard by which a choice of laws may be made. Fur-
thermore, I believe the majority's concern for predictability and the
parties' right to know what the agreement provides is adequately
taken into account by factors (d) (the protection of justified expec-
tations) and (f) (certainty, predictability and uniformity of result) of
section 6 of the Second Restatement which is made applicable to
section 188.24
Notwithstanding his preference for the Second Restatement, he concurred in
the majority's opinion because he believed that the result would be the same
under either approach.2
The question certified in Sturiano is unlikely to go away. It has in fact
arisen since-though not pressed by the parties to the supreme court level-
and almost surely will arise again.26 Given the division within the court
reflected in the Sturiano opinions, it seems appropriate to consider what the
20. Id. at 1129-30. (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1129.
22. Sturiano, 523 So. 2d at 1129.
23. Id. at 1130 (Grimes, J., concurring).
24. Id at 1130-31.
25. Id. at 1131.
26. See In re Santos, 648 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1995).
1997]
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court should do when it again confronts the issue. Should it take the same
approach for contracts as it did for torts and abandon lex loci contractus for
the approach of the Second Restatement? Certainly a good case can be made
for the change. Writing in 1987 on the eve of Sturiano, Professor Michael
Finch and his co-author, Lora Smeltzly, exhaustively surveyed the Florida
cases and concluded that the Second Restatement would bring "to Florida
conflicts law a structure and approach that impose some order on a seem-
ingly disparate body of precedent and that can guide the courts as conflicts
practice continues to evolve." 27 This is a defensible point of view, and in the
end I think the court will make the change-in part because change is in the
nature of things, in part because it will be difficult to resist the blandish-
ments of the district courts of appeal, who I suspect would prefer what they
perceive to be the greater freedom and flexibility offered by the Restatement
approach.
Yet the prospect leaves me with distinctly uneasy feelings. For one
thing, the doctrine of lex loci contractus, properly understood, has always
been a far more malleable one than its torts counterpart, lex loci delicti.
Despite the disparate contexts in which contracts cases can arise, I have no
sense from the decisions that Florida's courts have been unduly hampered in
arriving at sensible and just results with a fair degree of simplicity and
efficiency; nor am I persuaded that the actual results in cases would be that
much different or necessarily more defensible under the Second Restatement
approach than under the present one. For another, the Second Restatement
approach is complex and alive with protean possibilities, combining as it
does invitations to open-ended policy analysis with attempts to state specific
rules for a variety of commonly occurring kinds of cases. It has found favor
as a replacement for territorial methods with a number of courts around the
country,2 but in actual use it has been much criticized.29 In its complexity, it
has the potential to confuse and complicate decision making rather than
27. See Michael S. Finch & Lora Smeltzly, The Restatement Second and Conflict of
Laws: Extending the Bishop Approach to Problems in Contract, 16 STETSON L. REV. 261, 292
(1987).
28. See, e.g., ROGER C. CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWs 132 (5th ed. 1993); Patrick J.
Borchers, The Choice-of-Law Revolution: An Empirical Study, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 357,
362-64 (1992).
29. See, e.g., Larry Kramer, Choice of Law in the American Courts in 1990: Trends and
Developments, 39 AM. J. COMP. L. 465, 466, 486-89 (1991); Douglas Laycock, Equal
Citizens of Equal and Territorial States: The Constitutional Foundations of Choice of Law,
92 COLUM. L. REV. 249, 253 (1992); Joseph W. Singer, Real Conflicts, 69 B.U. L. REv. 1, 77
(1989).
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simplifying it. This observation is borne out by the uneven and disappoint-
ing experience in Florida thus far with the torts provisions of the Second
Restatement, particularly at the supreme court level.30
In short, I am not convinced that it would be productive for the court to
adopt the Second Restatement approach for cases in contract. I see little
advantage and potentially much grief flowing from it. There is not much
doubt that Florida can continue to survive with its traditional territorial
approach. Whether that would be a good thing or not is more debatable; like
almost any other method, lex loci contractus has shortcomings, but at least in
Florida these problems would not be eliminated by substituting the approach
of the Second Restatement. That is the thesis I shall try to develop in what
follows. The time is ripe, for there is no more pressing issue on the court's
rather meager conflict-of-laws agenda than this one.
II. FROM TERRITORIAL TO PoLIcY ANALYSIS: THE ROAD TO THE
SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS
A range of considerations bear on the question of whether lex loci
contractus should be replaced in Florida with the approach of the Second
Restatement. To raise these considerations and put some perspective on
them, I want to discuss two cases, both staples in the literature of conflict-of-
laws. They are Milliken v. Pratt,31 decided by the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court in 1878, and Lilienthal v. Kaufman,32 a 1964 decision of the
Oregon Supreme Court. These cases stand at opposite ends of the spectrum
of developments that have occurred in choice-of-law in the United States
from the nineteenth century to the present. Either directly or by implication
they have much to say about the traditional territorial approach and why it
has lost favor in many quarters. In this way, it will be possible to covey a
sense of what brought the Second Restatement into being so quickly on the
heels of the First Restatement and thus provide a framework for evaluating
its approach and how well or ill it deals with issues of contract and choice-
of-law.
30. See generally Southerland, supra note 5. For a somewhat more temperate appraisal,
see Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-Law Problems in Florida Courts: A Retrospective on the
Restatement (Second), 24 STETSON L. REv. 653 (1995). For an account of the Florida courts'
traditional approach to conflicts cases involving property, see Michael S. Finch, Choice-of-
law and Property, 26 STrESON L. REV. 257 (1996).
31. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
32. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
1997]
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A. Milliken v. Pratt
Daniel Pratt and his wife Sarah were life-long residents of Massachu-
setts. In 1870, Daniel, a businessman, applied to the Portland, Maine, firm
of Deering, Milliken & Co. for a line of credit. The firm agreed on the
condition that Sarah guarantee payment of the account up to the amount of
five hundred dollars. She executed a separate agreement to this effect at her
home and gave it to her husband, who mailed it to the firm in Portland.
During the following year, Daniel bought goods on credit from time to time
and paid for them promptly. Then in October 1871 he defaulted, leaving an
unpaid balance of $560.12. In January 1872, Deering-Milliken demanded
payment from Sarah under the guaranty. She refused. In 1875, the firm
brought suit against her in Massachusetts to recover $500 of the unpaid
balance.33
Sarah Pratt's refusal to honor her agreement, as well as her defense to
the lawsuit, was grounded in the male-dominated society of nineteenth-
century America and its attitude towards women. At the time she executed
the agreement in 1870, portions of the common law rule that. disabled
married women from entering into contracts in their own name were still in
force in Massachusetts. 34 At common law, marriage was considered a true
merger of two souls-one which only the husband survived as a legal
entity.35 This fiction no doubt made a great deal of sense to the men whose
business it was to lay down legal rules: wives, being women, were known to
be inexperienced in the ways of the world and thus in need of protection.
What better way to protect them than to insure that in any matter of impor-
tance-that is, one involving money or property-they could act only
through and in the name of their husbands?
It seems patent that it was husbands whom this convenient fiction
protected, but nevertheless that was the law in Massachusetts in 1870 when
Sarah executed the guaranty. As far as Massachusetts was concerned, she
had no capacity to enter into this kind of a contract in her own name, and her
guaranty was unenforceable. In Maine, on the other hand, it was perfectly
33. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 374-75.
34. Id. at 376-77.
35. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 184-85 (1973). See
generally MARYLYNN SALMON, WOMEN AND THE LAW OF PROPERTY IN EARLY AMERICA
(1986); Richard H. Chused, Married Women's Property Law: 1800-1850, 71 GEO. L.J. 1359
(1983).
[Vol. 21:777
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enforceable; Maine had emancipated married women by statute in 1866,
giving them the same power to contract that men and single women en-
joyed. 6 Massachusetts would likewise change its rule, but not until 1874,
well after the execution of the guaranty and the subsequent events that gave
rise to the lawsuit.37 The trial court held for Sarah, and Deering-Milliken
appealed.
The opinion of the Supreme Judicial Court, written by Chief Justice
Gray, began with a statement of the general rule:
[T]he validity of a contract is to be determined by the law of the
state in which it is made; if it is valid there, it is deemed valid eve-
rywhere, and will sustain an action in the courts of a state whose
laws do not permit such a contract.38
The agreement executed by Sarah at her home in Massachusetts, the court
said, was an offer which ripened into a contract only when Deering-Milliken
received the guaranty in Portland and acted on it there by selling goods on
credit to Daniel. The contract therefore had to be treated as one made and to
be performed in Maine. 39 The case fell within the general rule, and the only
question was whether Sarah's incapacity under Massachusetts law made a
difference.
On this point, the authorities were divided. On the continent, where the
civil law largely prevailed, the view was that the capacity to enter into a
contract was at all times governed by the law of a person's domicile,
regardless of where the contract was made.4° The weight of authority in
England and the United States went the other way, holding that capacity was
a function of the law of the place of contracting.41 Was it possible that
Sarah's contractual incapacity had traveled with her, so to speak, when she
went to Maine and made the contract? Such a rule, the court said, would
hardly be suitable for a nation like the United States:
[I]t is only by the comity of other states that laws can operate be-
yond the limit of the state that makes them. In the great majority of
cases, especially in this country, where it is so common to travel, or
36. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 376.
37. Id. at 377.
38. Id. at 375 (citation omitted).
39. Id. at 376.
40. Id. at 381, 382.
41. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 378-81.
1997]
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to transact business through agents, or to correspond by letter, from
one state to another, it is more just, as well as more convenient, to
have regard to the law of the place of the contract, as a uniform
rule operating on all contracts of the same kind, and which the
contracting parties may be presumed to have in contemplation
when making their contracts, than to require them at their peril to
know the domicil of those with whom they deal, and to ascertain
the law of that domicil, however remote, which in many cases
could not be done without such delay as would greatly cripple the
power of contracting abroad at all.42
The place-of-making rule was clearly the preferable one. The court took
note of the possibility that Sarah's incapacity might be considered "so fixed
by the settled policy of... [this] state, for the protection of its own citi-
zens ..... ,43 as to justify a refusal to give effect to the otherwise applicable
law of Maine. That condition plainly did not obtain in Massachusetts
even at the time of the making of the contract in question, a mar-
ried woman was vested by statute with a very extensive power to
carry on business by herself, and to bind herself by contracts with
regard to her own property, business and earnings, and, before the
bringing of the present action, the power had been extended so as
to include the making of all kinds of contracts, with any person but
her husband, as if she were unmarried. There is therefore no rea-
son of public policy which should prevent the maintenance of this
action.44
The court accordingly applied the law of Maine, upheld the validity of the
contract, and enforced it against Sarah.
The most striking thing about the case is the result: the contract was
enforced, notwithstanding that under Massachusetts law Sarah Pratt's pen
was bereft of ink when she signed the agreement. The reasoning of the
opinion was beguilingly syllogistic. The question was whether the contract
was valid. The court's choice-of-law rule told it to make this determination
by applying the law of the state where the contract was made. That state was
Maine, and the contract was valid there. The outcome seems so unexcep-
tional that it is easy to miss its implications.
42. Id. at 382-83.
43. Id. at 383.
44. Id.
[Vol. 21:777
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There was a problem in the first place because the laws of Maine and
Massachusetts differed as to matters of contractual capacity. The Massachu-
setts Legislature was in the process of changing the law to emancipate
married women as Maine had done, but at the time this case arose it still
retained so much of the older doctrine as disabled a married woman from
agreeing to guarantee her husband's debts. What was it about this situation
that warranted such focused attention? The prevailing climate of opinion
held that married women were subservient to their husbands and were
supposed to obey them in all things. It was therefore believed that they
could easily be influenced, even coerced, and hence were unlikely to act in
such a matter of their own free will or with full awareness of the conse-
quences. The relationship of marriage created a potential for abuse-of
wives most obviously, but also of creditors, who might otherwise rely on a
signature that was really no better than the debtor's own. There was a need
for special protection, or so the Massachusetts Legislature might reasonably
have believed.
Sarah Pratt was a Massachusetts married woman. No matter what the
court thought of the law and the wisdom of its underlying policy, it would
have had no choice but to invalidate the agreement if the case had arisen
entirely within Massachusetts-that is, if it had involved no out-of-state
elements. But here there was a choice, and it was one that the court exer-
cised with a will. Obviously it thought it was better to subordinate Sarah's
claim to the protection of Massachusetts law in order to uphold the contract
and enforce it in favor of a Maine creditor. The interesting question is why.
Much of the answer lies in the idea of contract and its importance to a
society constituted not along lines of status-caste, class, accidents of
birth-but on the radical proposition that "[t]he ideal way to organize social
relations was through free voluntary agreement, by persons pursuing their
own ends." 45 The movement from status to contract had its origins in
England, but nowhere did it reach fuller fruition than in the United States,
which almost from the beginning was a business and market-oriented, profit-
motivated society of individuals free to exercise their will and ambition in
order to prosper and improve their condition in life. A society like this
required the idea of contract, and the texture of this nation as it has evolved
and exists today-the myriad of commercial, economic, and social interrela-
45. FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 464.
19971
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tionships that undergird and define the United States can hardly be imagined
without it.46
Because it lay ready to hand, the legal system was given the important
role of maintaining an environment in which this kind of structured activity
could go on-an environment which not only encouraged the making of
agreements but also gave assurance that where necessary they would be
enforced. It was a role that courts took seriously, all the more so because the
law of contract itself did not shape the contours of social and economic
relationships so much as give tangible expression to deeply held beliefs
about what society valued in life and what the ground rules ought to be in
getting it.47 At the turn of the century, freedom of contract was considered
an essential part of the concept of ordered liberty enshrined in the due
process clause of the fourteenth amendment.48 If less than that today, it has
nevertheless numbered among this nation's articles of faith. The quasi-
religious overtones in that phrase are hardly misplaced.
It is easy to see the court's opinion as a reflection and affirmation of
these values. The justices of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
were a group of men stamped in the mold of a state that was among the
original centers of shipping, trade, commerce, business, and manufacturing
in the United States-a state built, almost literally, on the ability of men to
deal with one another at arm's length with the assurance that their bargains
would be kept. To these men, the importance of business and commercial
transactions was obvious; equally obvious was the need to encourage and
facilitate these transactions when they crossed state lines. The states were
sovereign, but not in the same way as the nation-states of Europe. Free and
unfettered commercial intercourse was the norm. "Especially in this
country," the court said, it would be unjust as well as inconvenient to allow
quirks of local law to interfere with the security of transactions.49 It would
46. See FRIEDRICH KESSLER & MALCOLM P. SHARP, CONTRACTS 2-9 (1st ed. 1953);
JAMES W. HURST, LAW AND THE CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY
UNITED STATES 5-29 (1956) [hereinafter CONDITIONS OF FREEDOM]; JAMES W. HURST, LAW
AND MARKETS IN UNITED STATES HISTORY 10-50 (1982); Morton J. Horwitz, The Historical
Foundations of Modern Contract Law, 87 HARV. L. REv. 917, 936-52 (1974).
47. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 35, at 244-47, 464-68; CONDITIONS OF FREEDEOM, supra
note 46, at 11-12; see generally LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, CONTRACT LAW IN AMERICA (1965).
48. See, e.g., Coppage v. Kansas, 236 U.S. 1 (1915); Adair v. United States, 208 U.S. 161
(1908); Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578
(1897).
49. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 382.
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"greatly cripple the power of contracting abroad at all."50 Far better to refer
these cases uniformly to the law of the place of contracting, which was the
law that parties presumably had in mind when they made agreements.
51
This typically hard-headed and practical assessment was leavened with
an element of cold-blooded calculation. It was not lost on the court that its
preferred set of values could be implemented only at the sacrifice of local
policy and the fortunes of a local resident. Massachusetts law presumed that
a married woman signed an agreement of this sort not of her own free will
and with full awareness of the consequences, but only in obedience to her
husband. It had to be presumed, therefore, that Sarah had not signed in the
belief that she could never be held to her agreement: there was no bad faith
or intention to deceive. She had never left her home in Massachusetts, much
less the shelter of its protective laws. She was the quintessential innocent
victim contemplated by the law. As to this aspect of the case, the opinion
was silent, the court's views appearing only by necessary implication in the
result. The fair inference is that a little injustice at the local level was a
small price to pay for furthering the orderly transaction of business.
This result was by no means inevitable. With a different order of values
the court might have put another interpretation on the course of the parties'
dealings with one another. It might, for example, have construed the writing
in question as a counteroffer by Deering-Milliken to sell goods to Daniel on
credit in exchange for Sarah's promise to guarantee payment.5 2 This offer
would have ripened into a contract when Sarah signed the agreement at her
home in Massachusetts and caused it to be placed in the mail there. The
instrument in fact recited the payment of one dollar as consideration
(although this sum was never paid).,3 The result would then have been a
separate contract between Deering-Milliken and Sarah, bilateral and execu-
tory in nature, but made in Massachusetts.
Another possibility for avoiding the application of Maine law lay in the
aspect of public policy touched upon briefly at the end of the opinion.
Territorial theory, in the version expounded by Joseph Story in his highly
influential nineteenth-century treatise, recognized the right of a state to
refuse to give effect to a law that would violate its own public policy. In
Story's view the territorial rules had their theoretical basis in the principle of
50. Id. at 382-83.
51. Id. at 382.
52. See RUSSEL WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 364-65 (3d ed.
1986).
53. Milliken, 125 Mass. at 376.
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comity. Enforcing another state's laws was therefore always a voluntary act,
and no state could be required "to yield up its own fundamental policy" to
that of another. 54 This was the root of the so-called public policy exception,
perhaps the most important of the judicially developed techniques for
avoiding the operation of territorial rules without rejecting them outright.55
The court was heavily influenced by Story's views and was therefore
well aware that it had the power to deny enforcement to the law of Maine.56
It had only to characterize Massachusetts' policy of protecting married
women as "fundamental," or, in its own words, as sufficiently "fixed by the
settled policy of the state ... Rationalizing this conclusion might have
been tricky in light of the demise of the policy in 1874; but as we shall see,
the contours of the public policy exception and the conditions necessary to
its invocation have never been precise.58 It could have been done if the court
54. STORY, supra note 2, § 25. "Much less," he continued, "can any nation be required
to sacrifice its own interests in favor of another; or to enforce doctrines, which, in a moral, or
political view, are incompatible with its own safety, or happiness, or conscientious regard to
justice and duty." Id.
55. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 141-45; Monrad G. Paulsen & Michael I.
Sovern, "Public Policy" in the Conflict of Laws, 56 COLUM. L. REV. 969 (1956).
56. Justice Story's treatise is approvingly cited at several points in the opinion, Milliken,
125 Mass. at 377, 378, 381, and the court plainly subscribed to the theory of comity as the
basis for the enforcement of extraterritorial rights:
As the law of another state can neither operate nor be executed in this state
by its own force, but only by the comity of this state, its operation and enforce-
ment here may be restricted by positive prohibition of statute. A state may al-
ways by express enactment protect itself from being obliged to enforce in its
courts contracts made abroad by its citizens, which are not authorized by its own
laws....
It is possible also that in a state where the common law prevailed in full
force, by which a married woman was deemed incapable of binding herself by
any contract whatever, it might be inferred that such an utter incapacity, lasting
throughout the joint lives of husband and wife, must be considered as so fixed by
the settled policy of the state, for the protection of its own citizens, that it could
not be held by the courts of that state to yield to the law of another state in which
she might undertake to contract.
Id. at 383.
57. Id.
58. See, e.g., HERBERT F. GOODRICH & EUGENE F. SCOLES, CONFLICT OF LAWS § 11, at 14
(4th ed. 1964):
Proponents of [the public policy] exception hold that the ordinarily applicable
conflict of laws doctrine will not be followed when to do so would violate the
strong public policy of the forum. As so used the term "public policy" is so
vague and general as to defy definition. The strength of the policy necessary to
call the exception into operation is unclear and varies with the facts.
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had wanted to protect Sarah Pratt, and it would have been neither the first
nor the last time that the name "fundamental" was put to a policy reflected in
some minor wrinkle of a state's law.59 In the end, protecting the bargain was
simply more important.
Milliken appears in many conflict-of-laws casebooks as a classic
illustration of the lex loci contractus rule, but its deeper significance lies in
the fact that it is utterly typical of the way in which American courts have
tended to deal with matters of contract and choice-of-law. They take as a
given that the institution of contract itself represents a value of fundamental
importance to society. Those who enter into agreements do so with goals
and purposes in mind; provided that an agreement is neither illegal nor
contrary to public policy, the intentions of the parties and the expectations
arising therefrom assume paramount importance. Courts perceive their
function to be the essentially legitimating one of effectuating the intentions
of the parties and thereby protecting their expectations.
60
With traditional methods, this disposition shows up in the decisions in
two primary ways. The first is in the willingness of courts to give effect to
the concept of party autonomy. Party autonomy has nothing to do with
territoriality as such, but refers to the ability of the parties to contract with
reference to the law of a particular jurisdiction. Sometimes their intent is
implicit in their agreement, 61 sometimes explicit in the form of a choice-of-
law clause.62 The idea originated in the eighteenth century in England in an
opinion by Lord Mansfield and quickly took hold in the United States.63 Its
popularity here is an obvious reflection of the importance attached to party
intentions, at least as long as the law chosen bears some sort of reasonable
relation to the parties or their transaction.
64
The second has to do with the territorial doctrine of lex loci contractus
and the way in which courts have used it in actual practice. The court's
Id.; see also CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 141-45; Paulsen & Sovem, supra note 55;
Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 463-69.
59. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (refusing to
give effect on public policy grounds to an "other insurance" clause contained in an insurance
policy issued in New Hampshire).
60. See, e.g., ROBERT A. LEFLAR Er AL., AMERICAN CONFLICTS LAW 420-23 (4th ed.
1986); EUGENEF. SCOLES & PETER HAY, CoN1tuCroFLAwS 657 (2d ed. 1992).
61. See, e.g., LEFLAR ETAL., supra note 60, at 413-14.
62. See, e.g., id. at 413-19.
63. See 2 JOSEPH H. BEALE, A TREATISE ON Ti CONFLICTS OF LAWS § 332.5, at 1092-
1100. The case was Robinson v. Bland, 2 Burr. 1077, 1 W. Bi. 234 (1760). See generally
ALBERTA. EHRENZWEiG, CONFLICT OF LAWS §§ 173-175 (1962).
64. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 669-673.
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statement of the rule in Milliken is accurate as far as it goes, but misleading
to the extent that it suggests that the law of the place of contracting governs
in every case. The Latinism "lex loci contractus" literally means the law of
the place of contracting, but the term is also loosely used to refer to the
territorial approach in contracts cases generally, and in this sense means
something more. In Scudder v. Union National Bank,65 for example, the case
relied upon by Chief Justice Gray, the Supreme Court set out the rule in
these terms:
Matters bearing upon the execution, the interpretation, and the
validity of a contract are determined by the law of the place where
the contract is made. Matters connected with its performance are
regulated by the law prevailing at the place of performance. Mat-
ters respecting the remedy, such as the bringing of suits, admissi-
bility of evidence, statutes of limitation, depend upon the law of the
place where the suit is brought.
66
It is apparent from this statement that lex loci contractus is not one rule,
but three. It therefore comes with a built-in flexibility that courts have not
hesitated to exploit in order to effectuate party intentions. Since this can
rarely be done by choosing a law that invalidates a contract, the over-
whelming observable tendency has been one of selective use of the three
rules to produce a choice of validating law. 67 The opinions frequently fail to
make the distinction between issues of validity and issues of performance.
Validity may be determined in one case by the law of the place of contract-
ing and in another by the law of the place of performance; in like fashion,
performance-related questions may, on one occasion, be determined by the
law of the place of performance and, on another, by the law of the place of
contracting. 68 And there are cases in which courts characterize the course of
65. 91 U.S. 406 (1875).
66. Id. at 412-13. In Walling v. Christian & Craft Grocery Co., 27 So. 46, 49 (Fla.
1899), the Supreme Court of Florida adopted the rule in the form adopted by the Scudder
Court, and it has been the law in Florida ever since. See, e.g., Jemco, Inc.- v. United Parcel
Serv., Inc., 400 So. 2d 499, 501 n.4 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1981).
67. See, e.g., LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 60, at 407 n.6, 420-23; EHRENZWEIG, supra note
63, at §§ 175-182.
68. See, e.g., BEALE, supra note 3, at 1105-09; LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 405-413.
In surveying cases in the United States Supreme Court from 1825 to 1928, Professor Beale
states:
It will thus be seen that almost every rule ever suggested for determining the
law applicable to the validity of a contract which has ever been seriously urged in
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the parties' dealings with one another in such a way as to locate the place of
making in a state whose law upholds the agreement.
69
Traditional practice might seem a doctrinal mess were it not for the
striking fact that the law chosen is usually one under which the contract in
question can be upheld. The wealth of judicial practice brings to mind one
of the more profound observations about the choice-of-law process, which
was made by Professor Robert Leflar. He said that choice-of-law has never
been a purely
jurisdiction-selecting process, with courts first deciding which
state's law should govern and checking afterward to see what that
state's law [is] .... Everyone knows that this is not what courts
do, nor what they should do. Judges know from the beginning
between which rules of law, and not just which states, they are
choosing....
... The inclination of any reasonable court will be to prefer
rules of law which make good socio-economic sense for the time
when the court speaks, whether they be its own or another state's
rules.70
The fair inference from the cases is that courts think that enforcing agree-
ments makes good socio-economic sense and are not above using the choice-
of-law decision itself as a way of furthering this value judgment.
The fact that courts engage in a certain amount of result-oriented
decision making is not the shocking proposition it once was. Whether this is
what they ought to do, as Leflar also asserts, is a different question and a
much more difficult one. Every conflict-of-laws case involves two deci-
sions. A court must first decide whose law governs, and then, under that
law, what the outcome is. The catch, of course, is that the choice-of-law
decision itself is often outcome-determinative. Hence the recurrent bedev-
iling question in choice-of-law centers on what "justice" means, or ought to
a common-law court has at one time or another been adopted by the Supreme
Court of the United States as the basis of its decision; that each decision has been
made apparently without realizing its inconsistency with former decisions; and
that many of the decisions are self-contradictory.
BEALE, supra note 3, at 1108-09.
69. See, e.g., Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Liebing, 259 U.S. 209 (1922); New York Life Ins.
Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357 (1918); Ray-Hof Agencies, Inc. v. Petersen, 123 So. 2d 251 (Fla.
1960); Confederation Life Ass'n v. Vega Y Arminan, 207 So. 2d 33 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1968); 2 ERNST RABEL, CoNFucr OF LAwS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 461-62 (2d ed. 1958).
70. Robert A. Leflar, Conflicts Law: More on Choice-Influencing Considerations, 54
CALU. L. REv. 1584, 1587-88 (1966).
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mean, in such a case. Does it mean making the choice-of-law decision in a
fair and impartial way, without regard to what result one law or the other
would produce when applied to the facts of a case? Or does it mean reach-
ing an end result that itself seems just, the choice-of-law decision being just
another means to that end? The question is hardly academic. It has far-
reaching implications for the kinds of choice-of-law rules that any particular
court will prefer, as well as for the use it will make of them.
No one labored longer or harder to isolate the process of choice from its
effect than Joseph Beale, the distinguished Harvard law professor who
served as the Reporter for the 1934 Restatement of Conflict of Laws. Beale
took the existing hodge-podge of traditional territorial practice and sought to
impose logic and order on it in order to create a perfectly fair and impartial
way of choosing law. To him, the content of the competing laws was
irrelevant as was the result that one law or the other might produce in a given
case. He was concerned only with how the choice-of-law decision was
made. He predicated his system on the concept of "vested rights." If acts
had legal significance, it could only be by virtue of the law of the place
where those acts occurred. Legal rights or liabilities created under that law
were said to vest at the moment of their creation and could thereafter be
enforced in some other place only in that form. It followed from this that
acts valid where done ought to be valid everywhere. Beale found the idea of
comity offensive; it implied discretion where in his view none existed. One
state applied the law of another, not out of deference and respect, but
because it was obligated to.7
For contracts, Beale dispensed summarily with the concept of party
autonomy. He argued that it was objectionable in theory because it con-
ferred upon the parties permission "to do a legislative act,' 72 and in practice
because it was too uncertain and unpredictable: no one could say what
effect a court might give to the expressed intent of the parties.73 He at-
tempted to transform the lex loci contractus doctrine into an instrument of
precision, drawing the sharpest possible line between issues of contract
validity and issues of performance.74 All questions concerning validity,
71. See generally BEALE, supra note 3.
72. See id. at 1079, 1080-83.
73. See id. at 1083-86.
74. In the comments, Professor Beale conceded that the process of separating the two
could be problematical:
[T]he nature of the obligation and the duty to render the performance for which a
party becomes bound is governed by the law of the place of contract-
ing.... [While] matters concerning performance of a contract are determined by
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including the nature of the obligation and the extent of the duty to perform it,
he decisively referred to the law of the place of contracting 75-- the place
where "the principal event necessary to make a contract" occurred. 76 This
was sound in theory, he said, because the question whether or not there was
a contract could- "on general principles be determined by no other law
the law of the place of performance .... A difficult problem is presented in de-
ciding whether a question in a dispute concerning a contract is one involving the
creation of an obligation or performance thereof. There is no distinction based
on logic alone between determining the creation of the contract and the rights
and duties thereunder on the one hand, and its performance on the
other.... Regardless of the lack of logic, however, problems arising out of dis-
putes upon contracts are settled as if certain acts pertained to the making of the
contract and other acts to its performance. The applicability of the rule that the
complete control of all questions is determined by the law of the place of con-
tracting is therefore modified upon practical considerations. One law is applied
to what is regarded as the initiation of a contract and another to what is regarded
as its final performance. The point at which initiation ceases and performance
begins is not a point which can be fixed by any rule of law of universal applica-
tion to all cases. Like all questions of degree, the solution must depend upon the
circumstances of each case and must be governed by the exercise of judgment.
RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 332 cmt. c (1934) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
Professor Beale pursued the distinction in the comments to section 358, which states the
general rule that issues of performance are governed by the law of the place of performance:
While the law of the place of performance is applicable to determine the
manner and sufficiency and conditions under which performance is to be made, it
is not applicable to the point where the substantial obligation of the parties is
materially altered. As stated in § 332, Comment c, there is no logical line which
separates questions of the obligation of the contract, which is determined by the
law of the place of contracting, from questions of performance, determined by
the law of the place of performance. There is, however, a practical line which is
drawn in every case by the particular circumstances thereof. When the applica-
tion of the law of the place of contracting would extend to the determination of
the minute details of the manner, method, time and sufficiency of performance so
that it would be an unreasonable regulation of acts in the place of performance,
the law of the place of contracting will cease to control and the law of the place
of performance will be applied. On the other hand, when the application of the
law of the place of performance would extend to a regulation of the substance of
the obligation to which the parties purported to bind themselves so that it would
unreasonably determine the effect of an agreement made in the place of con-
tracting, the law of the place of performance will give way to the law of the place
of contracting.
Id. § 358 cmt. b. It is worth noting that the comments in the First Restatement are unofficial;
that is, unlike the black-letter rules, they did not receive the endorsement of the American Law
Institute and therefore rest on the authority of the reporter alone.
75. See id. § 332.
76. Id. § 311 cmt. d.
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than... the law of the place of contracting., 77 It was practically the best
rule because there was usually no doubt where a contract was made, and it
was also the easiest for the parties to follow. 78  Details relating to the
performance of a contract, such as the manner, time, place, and sufficiency
thereof, he referred to the law of the place of performance.7 9
These rules were simple, logical, and ordinarily easy to apply. If widely
adopted and faithfully followed, they offered a number of advantages. They
would produce fair, impartial, and uniform results because courts every-
where would tend to make the choice-of-law decision in the same way. For
this reason, it would make no difference where a particular suit was brought.
The unseemly possibility of forum shopping would be eliminated altogether.
Just as important, the rules would make the choice-of-law process easy,
simple, certain, and predictable-qualities that the mass of conflicting
decisions from the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries seemed to
suggest were sorely needed.
Despite these virtues, the First Restatement has to be accounted a
failure. Though intended as a definitive statement of territorial theory, its
influence was never that great. Territoriality would remain the predominant
approach until the 1950s, but not necessarily in the "vested rights" version
prescribed in the Restatement; courts for the most part simply continued
doing what they had always done. 80 The clearest evidence of its rejection is
the fact that in 1953 the American Law Institute found it advisable to
commence work on a replacement. In essence the First Restatement failed
because it tried to reduce choice-of-law to a purely mechanical process. Its
rigidity left no room for maneuver; in taking the element of judgment out of
judging, it became a victim of its own drive for perfection. No one can deny
that fairness and impartiality, ease of application, simplicity, certainty,
predictability, and uniformity of result are important values in choice-of-law,
or indeed, in any area of law. What the fate of the First Restatement sug-
gests is that these values count for less in the minds of courts than the
freedom to decide cases in ways that are perceived to make good socio-
economic sense.
77. BEALE, supra note 3, at 1091.
78. Id. at 1091-92.
79. See RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 358.
80. For example, the vast majority of conflicts cases in Florida have been decided with
territorial rules, but the underlying theory has always been one of comity rather than vested
rights. See cases cited, supra note 8. It is rare to find a Florida appellate opinion in which the
First Restatement is even cited, much less relied upon.
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If nothing else, the First Restatement's existence is a persistent re-
minder that choice-of-law itself involves a choice-one that pits the need for
rules and the impulse to follow them against intuitions of justice in some
larger sense. If a court's choice-of-law rule calls for Georgia law, but its
sense of justice cries out for Florida law, then it has a choice-the more
agonizing one of values rather than laws. The dilemma is apt to seem most
acute when the otherwise applicable law is one that strikes a court as silly or
unwise. What "justice" is then may seem clear. At the same time, every
court knows there is only so much tolerance for decisions that depart from an
announced set of rules or that cannot easily be squared with them. There is
"justice" there, too, in considerations of fairness, expectations and reliance,
and certainty and predictability. If a court is simply going to "think deeply
and decide justly,"8' it has no need for choice-of-law rules at all. The result
of that can be chaos and confusion. What would happen as choice-of-law
entered the modem era is ample proof of that.
B. Lilienthal v. Kaufman
Given the importance of contract in the nation's history, the result in
Milliken is not surprising. But it makes all the more interesting the decision
in Lilienthal v. Kaufman82 in which, almost a hundred years later, a similar
case presented itself to the Oregon Supreme Court and was decided the other
way.
Like Milliken, Lilienthal involved a question of contractual disability
and its effect in a multi-state transaction. 3 Leonard Kaufman had been
declared a spendthrift by the courts in the State of Oregon and he had a
guardian appointed for him. The pertinent Oregon statute provided that all
contracts he might enter into thereafter, except for necessaries, were void-
able by the guardian. Kaufman was apparently obsessed with binoculars and
the buying and selling of them. He started a joint venture for that purpose
with one Olshen, an Oregon resident, who advanced funds to underwrite the
venture. When Kaufman tried to repay the loan with a bad check, Olshen
sued. In that case, Olshen v. Kaufman,84 the Oregon Supreme Court held
that the guardian had the right to void the contract and preclude recovery.
81. Maurice Rosenberg, Comments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 551, 644
(1968).
82. 395 P.2d 543 (Or. 1964).
83. Unless otherwise indicated, the facts are taken from the court's opinion.
84. 385 P.2d 161 (Or. 1963).
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Kaufman then went further afield, to California, where he persuaded
Philip Lilienthal, a California resident, to advance funds for a similar joint
venture, giving two promissory notes in exchange. The notes were executed
and delivered in California. Though Lilienthal made routine credit checks,
these failed to disclose that Kaufman was a spendthrift.85 When he pre-
sented the notes for payment, the guardian once again asserted Kaufman's
incapacity as a spendthrift and refused to pay. Lilienthal brought suit in
Oregon to collect on the notes. He argued that California was the place of
making since the notes were executed and delivered there, and that Oregon
was bound under its conflicts rule-lex loci contractus-to apply the law of
California. California law did not recognize the disability of a spendthrift.
The trial court held for Kaufman, and Lilienthal appealed.
The opinion of the Oregon Supreme Court was written by Justice
Denecke and ended by applying Oregon law and sustaining the spendthrift
defense. 86  Two justices dissented. The case has been the object of a
considerable amount of criticism in the conflicts literature, and few agree
with the result.8 7 I find it hard to share this view. To my mind, the majority
opinion is remarkable not only for its reasoning and result, but also for the
picture it gives of a conscientious court wrestling in a thorough and forth-
right way with a particularly thorny problem.
The first half of the opinion consisted of a frank concession that almost
all of the existing conflicts theories called for the application of California
law. It is worth tracing the court's discussion in some detail because it gives
a concise picture of how far choice-of-law thinking had come in the years
since Milliken v. Pratt was decided.
85. See CRAMTON ET AL., CONFLICT OF LAWS 253 (4th ed. 1987); David P. Currie, Com-
ments on Reich v. Purcell, 15 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 595, 603-04 (1968).
86. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 549.
87. See, e.g., CAVERS, THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROCESS 189-92 (1965); WEINTRAUB, supra
note 52, at 384-85; ScoLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 688-90; Willis L.M. Reese, Legislative
Jurisdiction, 78 COLuM. L. REV. 1587, 1597 (1978); Arthur T. von Mehren, Recent Trends in
Choice-of-Law Methodology, 60 CORNELL L. REv. 927, 938 (1975). But see Larry Kramer,
Rethinking Choice of Law, 90 COLUM. L. REv. 277, 323 (1990); Robert A. Sedler, Interest
Analysis and Forum Preference in the Conflict of Laws: A Response to the 'New Critics', 34
MERCER L. REV. 593, 602 n.50 (1983). And, as Professor Weintraub and others have noted,
the Oregon Supreme Court itself appears to have drastically reconsidered the approach it took
in the case. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 385-86 (discussing Casey v. Manson Constr.
and Eng'g Co., 428 P.2d 898 (Or. 1967)). He adds, however, that at least one Oregon
appellate court thinks that the Lilienthal approach is the correct one. See id. at 386 n.78
(citing Straight Grain Builders v. Track N' Trail, 760 P.2d 1350 (Or. App.)).
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Lex loci contractus of course pointed to the application of California
law. But here the court qualified its traditional reliance on that approach,
expressing doubt as to its correctness "if the only connection of the state
whose law would govern is that it was the place of making."88 The qualifi-
cation was a significant echo of the modem criticism of the jurisdiction-
selecting rules89 of the First Restatement. In the vastly different, highly
mobile society that America had become in the twentieth century, contracts
could be made anywhere. Businessmen from two different states might meet
for the weekend in New York City because they could take in a show while
they settled their deal; they might finalize contracts while traveling cross-
country by train or in a plane. These realities meant that the place where
people happened to be when a contract came into existence under the
familiar rules of the law of contracts could be wholly fortuitous, without
connection either to the parties or their transaction. The court called this the
"strongest criticism"' 90 of lex loci contractus, but the main thrust of the
rebellion against territoriality ran deeper. The jurisdiction-selecting rules of
the First Restatement took no account of the content of the competing laws
or the policies that they reflected; nor did they, in theory at least, provide
much latitude for courts in trying to achieve what they perceived to be just
results in individual cases.91
But in this case, as the court readily conceded, the place of making was
not California's only connection. Kaufman had gone to California to
persuade Lilienthal to lend him money. The loan was actually made in
California, and the promissory notes, in addition to being executed and
delivered in California, were also by their terms to be paid there. California,
in other words, was both the place of making and the place of performance.
88. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545.
89. The phrase 'jurisdiction-selecting rule" was coined by Professor David Cavers and
refers to a choice-of-law rule which uses a particular contact to select the state whose law is to
govern without consideration of the content of the law so chosen. See David F. Cavers, A
Critique of the Choice-of-Law Problem, 47 HARv. L. REV. 173, 194 (1933); DAVID F.
CAVERS, ThE CHOICE-or-LAW PRocEss at 9 n.24 (1965) ('The jurisdiction-selecting rule
makes a state the object of choice; in theory it is only after the rule has selected the governing
state by reference to the 'contact' prescribed in the rule that the court ascertains the content of
the state's law.").
90. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 545 (citing G. STUMBERG, CONFLICT OF LAWS 231 (3d ed.
1963)).
91. See, e.g., CAVERS, supra note 89; Cook, supra note 4; Brainerd Currie, Married
Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws Method, 25 U. Cm. L. REV. 227 (1958);
Ernest G. Lorenzen, Validity and Effects of Contracts in the Conflict of Laws, 30 YALE L.J.
565 (1921).
1997]
23
Southerland: Conflict of Laws in Florida: The Desirability of Extending the Se
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
The court cited various authorities, including a Tentative Draft of the Second
Restatement, for the proposition that the validity of a promissory note was
governed by the law of the place where payment was to be made.92
Still another principle calling for the application of California law was
the rule of validation-the idea that given a choice between a validating and
an invalidating law, a court should choose the law that upholds the parties'
agreement. The rule of validation, the court said,
is appealing because it is founded upon the same reasoning that is
followed in other aspects of the law of contracts. This court and all
other courts reiterate that contracts are "sacred and shall be en-
forced by the courts of justice unless some other overpowering rule
of public policy intervenes which renders such agreement illegal or
unenforceable. * * * Without such a rule the commerce of the
world would soon lapse into a chaotic state."... In the general law
of contracts we constantly strive to hold the contract valid and en-
forceable. The "rule of validation" has the same purpose in con-
flict of laws.
93
And to all of this the majority might just as well have added the dissenters'
argument that California law would also apply under the approach then
being pioneered by the New York Court of Appeals. 94 In 1954, that court
discarded the traditional rule of lex loci contractus in favor of what it called
the "center of gravity" or "grouping of contacts" approach.95 This approach
emphasized the law of the place "'which has the most significant contacts
with the matter in dispute'' 96 in order to give that place "paramount control
over the legal issues arising out of a particular factual context, thus allowing
the forum to apply the policy of the jurisdiction 'most intimately concerned
92. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 546 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS §
332b(a) (Tentative Draft No. 6, 1960)).
93. Id. (citations omitted). According to the court, the rule of validation held that
if the contract is valid under the law of any jurisdiction having significant con-
nection with the contract, i.e., place of making, place of performance, etc., the
law of that jurisdiction validating the contract will be applied. This would also
agree with the intentions of the parties, if they had had any intentions in this re-
gard. They must have intended their agreement to be valid.
I
94. Id. at 552 (Goodwin, J., dissenting).
95. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 101-02 (N.Y. 1954).
96. Id. at 102 (quoting Rubin v. Irving Trust Co., 113 N.E.2d 424,431 (N.Y. 1953)).
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with the outcome of [the] particular litigation."' 97 These seductive sounding
but somewhat imprecise phrases would soon find a reinforcing echo in the
Second Restatement's "most significant relationship" formulation. What-
ever "significant contacts" were, exactly, it was pretty clear that California
had them here.
It seemed that California law had to govern, yet the court avoided that
conclusion. To understand how it managed to do this on a principled basis
requires an understanding of the concept of interest analysis. Interest
analysis had emerged on the scene only a few years earlier. It was a break-
through in choice-of-law thinking at the time and has come to be recognized
since as the most important theoretical advance in the area in this century. It
was primarily the work of one man, Brainerd Currie, who proposed the idea
and elaborated it in a series of influential law review articles that appeared
between 1958 and 1963.98 As conceived by Currie, interest analysis was a
radically different way of looking at conflict-of-laws problems. It seemed to
be the catalyst that the choice-of-law revolution needed and more than
anything else was responsible for liberating choice-of-law from its territorial
constraints. Interest analysis quickly became an important conflicts method
in its own right as well as an integral component of almost all of the other
modem approaches, the Second Restatement among them.
Currie's method of analysis, in distilled form, ran along these lines. He
began with several propositions that seem almost self-evident. Law makers,
he said, ordinarily made rules of law with only the domestic situation in
mind.99 They were mainly concerned with events that happened within their
own borders and with the activities of their own residents; they rarely gave
thought to the extraterritorial consequences of those rules-that is, to how
they would want them to apply in the marginal conflict-of-laws case. 1°° All
of these rules embodied or expressed some social, economic, or administra-
tive policy01° which could be discovered through the familiar processes of
statutory interpretation or case analysis. 02 Having ascertained the policies
embodied in the conflicting laws of two states, Currie said, a court should
inquire whether the relationship of each state to the case was such that
97. Id. (quoting D. Martin Cook, Note, Choice of Law Problems in Direct Actions
Against Indemnification Insurers, 3 UTAHL. REv. 490,498-99 (1953)).
98. The major essays are collected in BRAINERD CURRIE, SELECTED ESSAYS ON THE
CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963).
99. See id. at 81-86.
100. See id.
101. See id. 85-86, 141-46.
102. See id. 183-84.
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applying its law would further or advance its policy. 10 3 If so, the state was
said to have an "interest" in the application of its law.
1°4
It was hardly coincidental that one of the earliest and most influential of
his articles- "Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-Laws
Method"'°5-- dealt with Milliken. It was a case rife with policy implica-
tions, 1°6 and Currie used it to demonstrate the inanity of the traditional
territorial rules-lex loci contractus, of course, in particular. Taking as
significant variables for choice-of-law purposes the states where the parties
resided, the place where suit was brought, and the place of making of the
contract, 07 he showed that of the fourteen possible conflict-of-laws prob-
lems that could arise, ten were false problems. They were false problems in
the sense that while the laws of the two states were in conflict, the policies
underlying them were not. 08
To illustrate this point, suppose that the residence of the parties were
reversed in Milliken, with the contract made in Massachusetts at the place of
business of the merchant and the suit brought in Maine where Sarah Pratt
resided. The application of Massachusetts law called for by the place-of-
making rule would subvert Maine's policy of enforcing contracts and
upholding commercial transactions; moreover, it would do so without any
corresponding advancement of Massachusetts' policy of protecting married
women because Sarah Pratt, in this variation, would not be a Massachusetts
married woman. Massachusetts, Currie argued, had no intention of protect-
ing married women generally, but only those married women with whose
103. See generally CURRIE, supra note 98.
104. See id.
105. See generally Currie, supra note 91.
106. In order to sharpen his discussion of the conflicting legislative polices of Massachu-
setts and Maine, Currie asked his readers to assume that in 1870 the Massachusetts Legislature
duly considered but refused to enact a bill that would have removed the contractual disabilities
of married women. He appeared to think that the actual change made in 1874 brought the
policies of the two states into alignment and destroyed any real conflict of interests. See
CURRIE, supra note 98, at 80-81. The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, however, did
not appear to view the case in that light, although its decision was undoubtedly made easier by
the change; rather, it considered the case on the basis of the laws as they existed in 1872 when
the cause of action arose. What effect should a post-occurrence change in law have on a
conflict-of-laws case? There is no definitive answer to this question. See, e.g., id. at 736-39;
CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 275-77; Robert A. Sedler, The Governmental Interest
Approach to Choice of Law: An Analysis and a Reformulation, 25 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 181,
236-42 (1977); Note, Post Transaction or Occurrence Events in Conflict of Laws, 69 COLUM.
L. REV. 843 (1969).
107. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 83.
108. See id. at 107.
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welfare it was concerned-namely, Massachusetts married women.1' 9 In the
terminology of interest analysis, Maine would have an interest in the
application of its law upholding the contract because that would further its
policy of security of transactions; Massachusetts would have no interest in
the application of its rule invalidating certain married women's contracts
because there was no Massachusetts married woman to protect. Maine
would therefore be the only state with an interest in the application of its
law. The place-of-making rule, blind to these kinds of considerations, would
woodenly call for the application of Massachusetts law and would thus
defeat the interests of both states. 110
The other false problems in this group of ten were similar, though not
always so perverse in defeating one state's interest without advancing the
interest of the other. They were similar in that all were cases in which only
one state was interested in the application of its law.' Currie then asked the
obvious question: if a state had no interest in the application of its law, why
apply it? That the place-of-making rule said so was hardly an answer. He
conceded that the territorial rules, at least in theory, were uniform, certain,
and predictable in operation and thus dissuasive of forum shopping, but he
thought that systematic subversion of state interests was too high a price to
pay for benefits that in practice were apt to be more illusory than real." 2 His
own solution was simple: in a case of false conflict, a court should apply the
law of the only interested state. 3
This way of looking at a conflicts case was revolutionary, and conflict-
of-laws has not been the same since Currie launched his withering attack on
the inanity of invariant use of territorial rules in cases of false conflict. He
told judges what they had instinctively known all along-that there was a
rational way to dispose of these cases and to do so forthrightly, without
resort to the subterfuge of escape devices. 14 Today, virtually every modem
approach to choice-of-law resolves false conflicts by applying the law of the
only interested state.
109. See id. at 85-86.
110. See id. at91.
111. See id. at 98.
112. CuRRiE, supra note 98, at 98-107.
113. Id. at 184.
114. Courts dissatisfied with the inexorable operation of territorial rules, especially as laid
down by Professor Beale in the First Restatement, showed considerable ingenuity in avoiding
them when the occasion demanded. Characterization, the substance-procedure distinction,
and the public policy exception were the principal techniques employed. See, e.g., Souther-
land & Waxman, supra note 1, at 458-69.
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The remaining four of the fourteen possible cases, however, were
qualitatively different. These were cases in which the conflict-of-laws was
real. In these cases, both states were interested in the application of their
laws, and it was therefore impossible to apply one state's law and advance
its policy without simultaneously suppressing the policy of the other."
5
Milliken was such a case, and, as we shall see, so was Lilienthal. In Mil-
liken, the Massachusetts court could not apply the law of Maine, thereby
advancing the policy of security of transactions, without at the same time
sacrificing its own policy of protecting Massachusetts married women such
as Sarah Pratt. One policy or the other had to yield. To Currie, true con-
flicts posed problems of uncommon difficulty. They were so difficult, in
fact, that he said there was "no conceivable choice-of-law rule that will solve
the problem, even though both states adopt it and consistently apply it.""
6
His own solution confounded a lot of people: "The sensible and clearly
constitutional thing for any court to do, confronted with a true conflict of
interests, is to apply its own law. In this way it can be sure at least that it is
consistently advancing the policy of its own state.""' 7
Currie characterized his proposal for resolving true conflicts as a "give-
it-up attitude," arguing that such an attitude was the only constructive one
when the task at hand was "impossible of accomplishment with the re-
sources.., available."' 8 He probably sensed that his proposal would not sit
well with judges bred in the bold and innovative tradition of the common
law and deeply committed, like the rest of the nation, to the belief that
rational solutions exist and can be discovered for any problem, however
thorny. In the event, he was right; his own solution has for the most part
been ignored by courts and commentators in favor of approaches that either
attempt to weigh one state's interest in the application of its law against
another's or, in some other way, strike a comparative balance between the
two." 9 Yet Currie's considered judgment compels reflection, the more so as
115. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 117.
116. Id. at 119.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 121.
119. See, e.g., CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 3, at 242; Kom, supra note 6, at 816-20. In
her valuable article surveying existing choice-of-law approaches and their actual use by courts
around the country, Professor Herma Hill Kay noted that "Currie's proposal that the forum
court, as an instrument of state policy, should apply forum law to advance its own state's
interests in true conflicts cases is unacceptable even to courts otherwise committed to interest
analysis." Herma Hill Kay, Theory into Practice: Choice of Law in the Courts, 34 MERCER L.
REv. 521, 551 (1983). Two states, Kentucky and Michigan, have adopted a forum law
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his objections to solutions of this kind have never, in my opinion, been
adequately answered.
Conflicts of laws exist in the first place because, within very broad
limits set by the Constitution, each state has sovereign power to determine
for itself the legal consequences of acts or events that occur within its
territory. Nothing in the Constitution prohibits different states from making
the same kinds of determinations in different ways. Oregon may choose to
treat contracts entered into by its spendthrifts as voidable if it wants to, while
California may choose to treat the financially irresponsible like everybody
else and hold them to their bargains. There is nothing startling in this. From
a sovereign standpoint, neither state is wrong in the course it has chosen.
Because both rules are equally correct, there can be no logical way to choose
between them. Like choosing between apples and oranges, it is possible to
prefer one over the other, but it makes no sense to say that one is "better."
All that can logically be said is that the two laws and the policies they reflect
are different.
Choosing law is always a legislative act, but never more profoundly so
than in cases of true conflict. In these cases, the choice-of-law decision
operates to nullify the valid legislative judgment of either one state or the
other. It is a qualitatively different choice from the ones courts routinely
make in domestic cases where there is only one "correct" rule of law. Currie
argued that "assessment of the respective vales of the competing legitimate
interests of two sovereign states, in order to determine which is to prevail, is
a political function of a very high order. This is a function that should not be
committed to courts in a democracy."'120 As a matter of separation of
powers, he did not think courts should perform this function, nor did he think
they were equipped to, isolated as they were from legislative facts and
lacking in the resources necessary to discover them.121 Though his forum-
law solution has not been widely adopted, there is still nothing approaching
general agreement about how true conflicts should be resolved. It is the
most hotly debated issue in choice-of-law today.
22
The influence of Currie's ideas is plainly evident in the second half of
the Lilienthal opinion, which began with a consideration of whether Ore-
solution for conflicts cases, but not "explicitly tied to an analysis of the policies underlying
forum law." Id. at 561. Professor Kay's survey of judicial practice is updated in A Defense of
Currie's Governmental Interest Analysis, 215 RECUEIL DES COORS D'ACADEMIE DO DRorr
INT'L, 182-83 (1990).
120. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 182.
121. See id.
122. See, e.g., CRAMTONETAL., supra note 3, at 271-358.
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gon's policy of protecting spendthrifts was sufficiently strongly held to
warrant invoking the familiar public policy exception and refusing to give
effect to the otherwise applicable law of California. Within the concept of
"public policy," the court said
we must consider the economic and social interests of Oregon.
When these factors are included in a consideration of whether the
law of the forum should be applied this traditional approach is very
similar to that advocated by many legal scholars. This latter theory
is "that choice-of-law rules should rationally advance the policies
or interests of the several states (or of the nations in the world
community). '' 123
In making this radical statement, the court was talking about interest analy-
sis, as the citations to and about Currie's writings made clear.' For a
definition of public policy, the court had traditionally relied on Justice
Cardozo's classic statement that the law of another state would not be
applied if to do so "would violate some fundamental principle of justice,
some prevalent conception of good morals, some deep-rooted tradition of the
common weal."'2 But the trouble with this formulation, the court con-
cluded, was that it was difficult to determine which policies were
"fundamental" and which weren't because of the "lack of any even remotely
objective standards." 126 Then came the turning point of the opinion:
[A]s previously stated, if we include in our search for the public
policy of the forum a consideration of the various interests that the
forum has in this litigation, we are guided by more definite criteria.
In addition to the interests of the forum, we should consider the
interests of the other jurisdictions which have some connection
with the transaction.
27
The court found that Oregon's spendthrift policy was aimed at protect-
ing the spendthrift's family, presumably an Oregon family, and at avoiding
123. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 547 (quoting Alfred Hill, Governmental Interest and the
Conflict of Laws-A Reply to Professor Currie, 27 U. CHI. L. REv. 463, 474 (1960)).
124. See id.
125. Id. (quoting Loucks v. Standard Oil Co., 120 N.E. 198, 202 (N.Y. 1918) (citations
omitted)).
126. Id. at 548.
127. Id.
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having to support the spendthrift and his family at public expense.12 It also
acknowledged Oregon's "strong policy favoring the validity and enforce-
ability of contracts,"'129 regardless of where made, as well as one of protect-
ing innocent, persons from fraudulent conduct of the sort engaged in by
Kaufman.1 30 And of course it was in Oregon's interest to encourage persons
from other states to transact business with Oregonians.13 1 Obviously these
interests cut both ways, but the "substance of these commercial considera-
tions," the court said, "is deflated by the recollection that the Oregon
Legislature has determined, despite the weight of these considerations, that a
spendthrift's contracts are voidable."' 32 California's most direct interest was
in "having its citizen creditor paid. 133 It was California's policy "that any
creditor, in California or otherwise, should be paid even though the debtor is
a spendthrift."'134 And, like Oregon, California also wanted to be a state "in
which contracts can be made and performance be promised with the certain
knowledge that such contracts will be enforced."
135
This comprehensive analysis of underlying policies and interests led the
court to the conclusion that it was dealing with a true conflict: "[w]e have,
then, two jurisdictions, each with several close connections with the transac-
tion, and each with a substantial interest, which will be served or thwarted,
depending on which law is applied. The interests of neither jurisdiction are
clearly more important than those of the other."' 36 In such a case, the court
thought, Oregon policy should prevail, and the law of Oregon should be
applied. The rationale showed just how deeply in Currie's debt this court
was:
Courts are instruments of state policy. The Oregon Legislature
has adopted a policy to avoid possible hardship to an Oregon fam-
ily of a spendthrift and to avoid possible expenditure of Oregon
public funds which might occur if the spendthrift is required to pay
his obligations. In litigation Oregon courts are the appropriate in-
strument to enforce this policy. The mechanical application of
choice-of-law rules would be the only apparent reason for an Ore-
128. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 548-49.
129. Id. at 549.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. Lilienthal, 395 P.2d at 549.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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gon court advancing the interests of California over the equally
valid interests of Oregon. The present principles of conflict of
laws are not favorable to such mechanical application.
137
Lilienthal was a remarkable decision in several respects. Despite the
strength of California's ties to the case, the court's method of analysis,
explicitly in terms of underlying policies and state interests, brought it to the
recognition that it was dealing with a true conflict-of-laws--one in which it
could not possibly advance the policies of one state without nullifying those
of the other. Significantly, the court treated these interests as being of equal
dignity. It made no pretense of reasoning its way out of the impasse by
delving into the content of the laws in order to assess the wisdom of the
policies that each expressed; it made no effort to assess the relative degree to
which each state was attached to its policy or the strength with which it was
held. It refused, in short, to weigh Oregon's interest in its rather special
policy aimed at protecting the occasional spendthrift against the obviously
strong interests both states shared in enforcing contracts and upholding
commercial transactions. It recognized that the Oregon Legislature had
already made that judgment and refused to substitute its own. In the end,
this was not a case in which Oregon's spendthrift policy was characterized
as "strongly held" and that familiar exception invoked as a ground for
refusing to apply the otherwise applicable law of another state. It was a
decision cast altogether in the entirely new mold of interest analysis.
The decision also gives a good indication of just how far choice-of-law
had come in the slightly-less-than one hundred years since Milliken was
decided in 1878. The choice-of-law revolution began to brew in earnest in
the 1930s. 138 It was characterized by the increasingly scathing attacks of
commentators on the rigid mechanization of conflicts rules that Beale's
theories and his First Restatement imposed, and by a corresponding willing-
ness on the part of distinguished courts to avoid those rules by invoking
escape devices. It took Brainerd Currie and his synthesis of interest analysis,
however, to catalyze smoldering discontent into full-blown revolution.
What Currie did, most decisively, was to restore prominence to a fact
that territorial theory obscured: all laws reflect some policy and are intended
to serve some purpose. He showed how destructive the traditional rules
were of policies and purposes. By defining a state's interest in the applica-
137. Id.
138. The literature of conflict-of-laws is replete with accounts of the revolution. See, e.g.,
Kom, supra note 6, at 775-77; Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 458-80.
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tion of its law in terms of furthering the policy underlying it, he provided an
intellectually satisfying way of identifying false conflicts and distinguishing
them from true conflicts. The distinction, it turned out, was one between
easy cases and hard cases. The simple and sensible disposition of the easy
cases was almost self-evident: apply the law of the only interested state. For
the hard cases, Currie had no ready answer, only the recognition that
reasoned resolution was impossible and that a court, as an instrument of state
policy, should do what it was constitutionally sworn to do, which was to
uphold the policies and laws of its own state.
Territorial theory made the choice-of-law turn on a single event and the
place where that happened. Currie demonstrated in graphic fashion just how
irrelevant such a single connector could be when measured against the
purposes and policies that laws were intended to serve. But even before his
work appeared, there was widespread dissatisfaction with the rigid jurisdic-
tion-selecting rules of territorial theory, particularly in their dogmatic 1934
Restatement by Beale. The discontent was by far most acute in the area of
torts, whose whole underlying purpose had undergone drastic rethinking in
the face of the spiraling costs of death and accident-related injury that rapid
industrialization and technological growth had brought in their wake.
Punishment and admonition gave way in the twentieth century to the
compensation imperative. And here, in case after case, the inflexible place-
of-injury rule frustrated the growing trend toward finding ways to compen-
sate accident victims for their injuries. 39 By comparison, the pressure for
change was far less intense in the area of contracts, where the dominant
values-maintaining the security of transactions, effectuating party inten-
tions, and protecting party expectations-seemed so well understood. These
values did not change from one century to the next, and in the perception of
many courts the familiar rules of territorial theory were adequate to subserve
them.
This was true only to a point. As we have seen, lex loci contractus,
loosely treated, did lend itself to value-oriented decision making more
readily than its torts counterpart. But in a strict sense, it was not designed
that way, and this was nowhere more evident than in the 1934 Restatement.
In his effort to reduce conflicts law to an exact science and achieve the
cherished virtues of certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result, Beale
distinguished sharply between issues of contract validity and those of
performance. He was adamant in insisting that where validity was the issue,
139. See, e.g., Southerland, supra note 5, at 786-90.
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the law of the place of making had to govern; vested rights theory and logic
required it. This was problematic for anyone who took the First Restatement
as the final and definitive statement of territorial theory it was meant to be
and who tried to follow its dictates literally. In the more closely knit,
infinitely more mobile United States of the twentieth century, the place
where a contract was made could easily be fortuitous, unrelated either to the
parties themselves or to their transaction. This concern was evident in
Lilienthal in the majority's qualification of its long-standing adherence to lex
loci contractus. In such a world it was increasingly hard to see how any
single connector could possibly be decisive.
In the First Restatement, Beale constructed the perfect machine for
achieving conflicts justice-that is, for choosing the governing law in as fair
and just a way as possible. He was indifferent to the result the law so chosen
might produce in a given case. His uncompromising attitude was useful in a
way, for it forced courts to confront the question whether perfect conflicts
justice, according to Beale, was worth the price. Increasingly at mid-century
the answer was no. Compared to end results that made good socio-economic
sense, the attainment of logical rigor and with it the promised land of simple
and easy application, certainty, predictability, and uniformity of result
seemed secondary. This was especially true in the area of contracts where
the "right" result--one that enforced contracts and protected party expecta-
tions-was usually uppermost in the minds of courts.
In the hundred years from Milliken to Lilienthal, the nation had
changed. It had grown smaller, more interrelated and interwoven. Cata-
clysmic events-the Great Depression and World War II in particular-
increased the power of the federal government at the expense of the states.
They were sovereign still, but in a much diminished way. State lines no
longer stood as high barriers to resolving cases in ways that seemed to make
good sense. Territoriality itself was no longer talismanic. What was
increasingly evident was a disposition on the part of courts to treat the
choice-of-law decision as a means to an end rather than an end in itself.' 4°
The first real break with Beale's systematics came in 1954, when the
New York Court of Appeals discarded territoriality and replaced it with the
center-of-gravity or grouping-of-contacts approach.' 4 1 In its simplicity, the
idea had to seem appealing: if a single contact such as the place of making
was no longer to be decisive, then why not consider all of the contacts that
the parties, their transaction, and the litigation had with the states con-
140. See, e.g., id. at 787-90, 811-14.
141. See Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954).
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cerned? One state's contacts were almost bound to preponderate, and that
would identify the state "most intimately concerned"' 42 with the outcome,
hence the state whose law should govern. But this approach, as Currie and
other critics would soon point out, had its own set of problems-chiefly, in
Currie's estimation, its utter incompatibility with governmental interest
analysis. 43
It was this period of turmoil, growth, and change that formed the matrix
for the American Law Institute's second effort to restate the law of conflict-
of-laws. With Columbia law professor Willis L.M. Reese as the Reporter,
work began on the project in the early 1950s and continued for almost
twenty years. The Second Restatement appeared in final form in 1971. In
its many tentative drafts, it both influenced the choice-of-law revolution and
in turn was influenced by it. A sense of the scope and magnitude of the
undertaking, as well as of the forces that drove it, can be gathered from the
comments of Herbert Wechsler, the Institute's director, in the
"Introduction." The Second Restatement, he said:
[I]s a treatment that takes full account of the enormous change in
dominant judicial thought respecting conflicts problems that has
taken place in relatively recent years. The essence of that change
has been the jettisoning of a multiplicity of rigid rules in favor of
standards of greater flexibility, according sensitivity in judgment to
important values that were formerly ignored. Such a transforma-
tion in the corpus of the law reduces certitude as well as certainty,
posing a special problem in the process of restatement. Its solution
lies in candid recognition that black-letter formulations often must
consist of open-ended standards, gaining further content from rea-
soned elaboration in the comments and specific instances of appli-
cation given there or in the notes of the Reporter. That technique is
not unique to Conflicts but the situation here has called for its em-
ployment quite pervasively throughout these volumes. The result
presents a striking contrast to the first Restatement in which dogma
was so thoroughly enshrined. 44
Just how striking, we shall soon see. We can profitably turn at this point to
the Second Restatement itself to see what it made of all the turmoil and
142. Id. at 102 (citation omitted).
143. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 727-36.
144. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONF CT OF LAWS, vii (1971) [hereinafter RE-
STATEMENT (SECoND)].
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change and how effectively its provisions deal with issues of contract and
choice-of-law.
III. THE SECOND RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS AND ITS
APPROACH TO CASES IN CONTRACT
The Second Restatement is organized on a single fundamental principle.
It is that rights and liabilities with respect to any given issue are determined
by the law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has "the most
significant relationship" to the occurrence and the parties. 145 This principle
entirely supplants the vested-rights doctrine of the First Restatement, which,
the Reporter says, "has not prevailed in the courts and is rejected" through-
out.
146
Chapter 8 deals with contracts. It is subdivided into six topics, only the
first of which-"Validity Of Contracts And Rights Created Thereby"-bears
on the present discussion. This topic has three subparts. Title A states the
"General Principles" and contains the all-important sections 187 and 188.
Title B, comprising sections 189 to 197, deals with particular types of
contracts, and Title C, sections 198 to 207, with particular issues in contract.
Extensive comments follow each section, and they are of considerable help
in understanding the black-letter rules. Particular note should be taken of the
fact that these comments are "official," which is to say that they, like the
black-letter rules themselves, have received the endorsement of the Ameri-
can Law Institute.147 This was not true of the comments in the original
Restatement.
One of the most important doctrinal changes made by the Second
Restatement is in the area of party autonomy, which refers to the practice of
allowing the parties to choose the law that will govern their agreement.
American courts, it will be recalled, were quick to recognize this power in
contracting parties and ratified it with a will in their decisions. The use of
choice-of-law clauses became increasingly common in the twentieth century,
particularly in contracts important enough to be drafted by attorneys. Beale
opposed the concept and refused to incorporate it in the original Restate-
ment, but his views on the subject were largely ignored by the courts.
Section 187 of the Second Restatement-stating one of the two
"General Principles" which dominate the chapter on contracts-takes the
145. See id. at vii-viii.
146. See id. at 557 (ch. 8, Introductory Note).
147. See id. at viii.
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eminently sensible approach and gives explicit recognition to the power of
the parties to choose the governing law as long as there is a reasonable basis
for their choice, as where the state chosen bears a "substantial relationship"
either to the parties or the transaction. 48 For many years, the Supreme Court
of Florida, following the well-known decision in Seeman v. Philadelphia
Warehouse Co.,1 49 has taken the position that the parties' choice of a
particular state's law to govern their agreement will be upheld if the agree-
ment bears a "normal and reasonable relation" to that state.150 Section 187 is
largely congruent with existing doctrine in Florida and would not be likely to
effect the trend of decisions in this area if the Restatement approach were
adopted here.'15
Section 188, which states the second of the two "General Principles," is
more problematic. This section deals with those cases that would formerly
have been decided under the lex loci contractus doctrine-those in which the
parties have made no attempt to choose their own law. 152 Section 188(1)
148. See id. § 187. This section, entitled "Law of the State Chosen by the Parties" pro-
vides:
(1) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied if the particular issue is one which the parties could
have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to that issue.
(2) The law of the state chosen by the parties to govern their contractual rights
and duties will be applied, even if the particular issue is one which the parties
could not have resolved by an explicit provision in their agreement directed to
that issue, unless either
(a) the chosen state has no substantial relationship to the parties or the trans-
action and there is no other reasonable basis for the parties' choice, or
(b) application of the law of the chosen state would be contrary to a funda-
mental policy of a state which has a materially greater interest than the chosen
state in the determination of the particular issue and which, under the rule of §
188, would be the state of the applicable law in the absence of an effective choice
of law by the parties.
(3) In the absence of a contrary indication of intention, the reference is to the lo-
cal law of the state of the chosen law.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 187.
149. 274 U.S. 403 (1927).
150. See Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank & Trust Co., 404 So.
2d 1059, 1063 (Fla. 1981); Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d
507, 512 (Fla. 1981).
151. See Finch & Smeltzly, supra note 27, at 282-84.
152. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188. This section, entitled "Law Gov-
erning in Absence of Effective Choice by the Parties," provides:
(1) The rights and duties of the parties with respect to an issue in contract are
determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
19971
37
Southerland: Conflict of Laws in Florida: The Desirability of Extending the Se
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
provides that in the absence of an effective choice by the parties, their rights
and duties with respect to an issue in contract are determined by the local
law of the state having "the most significant relationship to the transaction
and the parties under the principles stated in § 6. ' '153 Section 188(2) then
lists five contacts that a court is to consider in applying the principles of
section 6. These are the place of contracting, the place of negotiation, the
place of performance, the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
the geographical location of the parties-their domicile, residence, place of
incorporation, or place of business. 54
The reference to section 6 is a critical one. Section 6 is by far the most
innovative and important section in the entire Restatement 55 and is applica-
ble to choice-of-law in all areas.' 56  Section 6(1) first directs a court to
follow a statutory directive of its own state on choice-of-law if there is
most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) In the absence of an effective choice of law by the parties (see § 187), the
contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to determine
the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place of contracting,
(b) the place of negotiation of the contract,
(c) the place of performance,
(d) the location of the subject matter of the contract, and
(e) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
(3) If the place of negotiating the contract and the place of performance are in
the same state, the local law of this state will usually be applied, except as other-
wise provided in §§ 189-199 and 203.
153. See id. § 188(1).
154. See id. § 188(2).
155. See id. § 6, entitled "Choice-of-Law Principles," which provides:
(1) A court, subject to constitutional restrictions, will follow a statutory directive
of its own state on choice of law.
(2) When there is no such directive, the factors relevant to the choice of the ap-
plicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative interests of
those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.
156. See id. § 6(2) cmt. c.
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one. 157 If there is none, which is typically the case, section 6(2) lists seven
choice-influencing considerations that a court is to take into account in
making its decision.15 8  The comments say that the enumeration is not
exclusive and that the factors are unranked and unweighted15 9 The seven
factors are:
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems,
(b) the relevant policies of the forum,
(c) the relevant policies of other interested states and the relative
interests of those states in the determination of the particular issue,
(d) the protection of justified expectations,
(e) the basic policies underlying the particular field of law,
(f) certainty, predictability and uniformity of result, and
(g) ease in the determination and application of the law to be ap-
plied.' 6
The central theory of the Second Restatement, Professor Reese has written
elsewhere, is that "the values stated in section 6 underlie the entire field of
choice of law and that all of the black letter rules stem from these values."' 61
The choice-influencing considerations of section 6, in other words, represent
an attempt to distill those values that various courts and commentators at
various times and places have thought to be of importance in the choice-of-
law process. 62 Professor Reese is quick to concede that in a given case
these values may point in different directions and that from one area of law
to another some may be of greater importance than others. 63 But "the fact
remains that these are the values that underlie choice of law and that have
guided the courts in their decisions. '' 64 He believes that the ultimate success
of the Restatement depends on the correctness of this perception. 65
157. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(1).
158. Id. § 6(2).
159. Id. § 6(2) cmt. c.
160. Id. § 6(2).
161. Willis L.M. Reese, The Second Restatement of Conflict of Laws Revisited, 34
MERCERL. REv. 501, 516 (1983).
162. See id. at 509.
163. See id. at 513.
164. Id.
165. See id. at 516-17.
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The seven choice-influencing considerations of section 6 fall into five
groups, each representing a distinct choice-of-law value. 166 The first of these
comes mainly from section 6(2)(a)---"the needs of the interstate and interna-
tional systems"-and is reminiscent of the ideas reflected in the principle of
comity. It is a fundamental caution that a state should not ruthlessly pursue
its own self-interest at the expense of another state or of the community of
states. According to the comments, choice-of-law rules should "seek to
further harmonious relations between states and to facilitate commercial
intercourse between them.... [A] state should have regard for the needs and
policies of other states and of the community of states." 167 Rules that reflect
this sensitivity and concern for the needs of other states, it is believed, will
commend themselves for widespread adoption, and this, in turn, will pro-
mote the "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" spoken of in
section 6(2)(f).168
The second value centers on interest analysis, which has a prominent
place among the choice-influencing considerations of section 6. The
provisions are sections 6(2)(b) and (c)-"the relevant policies of the forum"
and "the relevant policies of other interested states ... ,,169 These sections,
Professor Reese has written, give "support to the views of Professor Brain-
erd Currie and of those other advocates of what is popularly referred to as
the 'governmental interest' approach to choice of law., 170 The comments
that accompany these provisions are strongly reminiscent of Currie:
Every rule of law, whether embodied in a statute or in a com-
mon law rule, was designed to achieve one or more purposes. A
court should have regard for these purposes in determining whether
to apply its own rule or the rule of another state in the decision of a
particular issue. If the purposes sought to be achieved by a local
statute or common law rule would be furthered by its application to
out-of-state facts, this is a weighty reason why such application
should be made....
166. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(1) cmt. b; Reese, supra note
161, at 508-13.
167. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. d.
168. See id. § 6(2)(f).
169. Id. § 6(2)(b)-(c).
170. Reese, supra note 161, at 509.
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... [TJhe forum should give consideration not only to its own rele-
vant policies ... but also to the relevant policies of all other inter-
ested states.171
The third value is concerned with the needs of the parties and is
reflected in sections 6(2)(d), "the protection of justified expectations,' '072 and
6(2)(f), "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result."'73 This value is
obviously of pre-eminent importance in the area of contracts' 74 and in this
context gains support from the fourth value, which is stated in section
6(2)(e), "the basic policies underlying the particular field of law."' ' The
comments to section 188(1) say flatly that "[p]rotection of the justified
expectations of the parties is the basic policy underlying the field of con-
tracts." 176 The fifth value concerns the needs of judicial administration and
is reflected mainly in section 6(2)(g), "ease in the determination and appli-
cation of the law to be applied."
177
Section 188, read in conjunction with the principles and values of
section 6, obviously invites an open-ended policy analysis of the broadest
sort in determining the state whose relationship to the transaction and the
parties is "most significant." Considering that the Restatement nowhere
defines a "significant" relationship or differentiates it from one that is not
significant, the calculus called for by these two sections may strike some as
intolerably vague and uncertain. But the sections immediately following
section 188, which deal with particular types of contracts and particular
issues in contract, attempt to dispel some of the uncertainty. Though the
general principle of section 188 is "applicable to all contracts and to all
issues in contract,"' 78 the Reporter nevertheless believes it possible, "on the
basis of existing knowledge, to lay down more precise rules for determining
the state of the applicable law.... It seems clear that the best way to bring
precision into the field is by attempting to state special rules for particular
contracts and for particular issues.,, 179 Or put more bluntly, the wonderfully
open-ended, policy-oriented approach of sections 6 and 188 collapses for
171. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmts. e-f.
172. Id. § 6(2)(d).
173. Id. § 6(2)(f).
174. See Reese, supra note 161, at 511-12.
175. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2)(e).
176. Id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
177. Id. § 6(2)(g).
178. Id. § 186 cmt. a.
179. Id.
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particular types of contracts and issues in contract into a series of presump-
tive rules as to the state of most significant relationship.
With respect to particular types of contracts, the Reporter believes it
possible from existing experience to state that a "particular contact plays an
especially important role in the determination of the state of applicable
law."'180 The rules stated in these specific sections presume, in other words,
that a state having a certain geographical connection or contact with a case
will ordinarily be the state of most significant relationship. These are of
course jurisdiction-selecting rules, and in their territorial bias they are
strikingly similar to the traditional approach under the lex loci contractus
doctrine.
Here, for particular types of contracts, are the important contacts and
resultant presumptions as to the state of most significant relationship: for
contracts involving transfers of interests in land, the state where the land is
situated; 181 for contracts for the sale of a chattel, the state where the seller is
to deliver; 182 for life insurance contracts, the state where the insured was
domiciled at the time the policy was applied for;' 83 for contracts of fire,
surety, or casualty insurance, the state where the parties understood the
principal location of the insured risk to be;184 for contracts of suretyship, the
state whose law governs the principal obligation; 85 for contracts for the
repayment of money lent, the state where the contract requires repayment;
86
for contracts for the rendition of services, the state where the services are to
be rendered;' 87 and for contracts of transportation, the state from which the
passenger departs or the goods are dispatched. 188 It is important to bear in
mind that these rules are presumptions only. Each section contains the
explicit qualification that the presumption is subject to displacement if some
other state has "a more significant relationship" to the transaction and the
parties "under the principles stated in § 6. "189
180. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 189 (Title B, Introductory Note).
181. Id. §§ 189, 190.
182. Id. § 191.
183. Id. § 192.
184. Id. § 193.
185. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 194.
186. Id. § 195.
187. Id. § 196.
188. Id. § 197.
189. See, e.g., id. § 195. This section provides:
The validity of a contract for the repayment of money lent and the rights created
thereby are determined, in the absence of an effective choice of law by the par-
ties, by the local law of the state where the contract requires that repayment be
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Particular issues in contract receive considerably less categorical
treatment. Some of the rules simply state that an issue is to be determined by
the law selected by application of the general principle of section 188.
Issues in this group are those which concern the validity of a contract in
respects other than capacity and formalities; 19° the effect on a contract of
misrepresentation, duress, undue influence, and mistake;' 91 the construction
of words used in a contract;' 92 the nature and extent of the rights and duties
created by a contract; 193 and the measure of recovery for a breach of con-
tract.194 Others are in two parts, the first part stating that the issue is to be
determined by application of the rule of section 188, the second then
offering a tentative suggestion as to what the result of such application
would ordinarily be. Thus, a party's contractual capacity will be upheld if
she has such capacity under the law of her domicile; 195 formalities meeting
the requirements of the place of execution "will usually be acceptable";
196
and contracts calling for performance which is illegal in the place of per-
formance "will usually be denied enforcement."'
197
Additionally, two issues are singled out for special treatment: usury and
details of performance. Section 203 provides that a contract will be upheld
against a charge of usury "if it provides for a rate of interest that is permissi-
ble in a state to which the contract has a substantial relationship and is not
greatly in excess of the rate permitted" by the law of the state that would
otherwise have the most significant relationship under section 188.98 And
section 206 states that "[i]ssues relating to details of performance ... are
determined by the local law of the place of performance."'
99
I think it is important to stress that the general approach of the Restate-
ment aims at identifying the state of most significant relationship under
sections 6 and 188. The presumptions and suggested answers of the specific
made, unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other state has a more
significant relationship under the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and
the parties, in which event the local law of the other state will be applied.
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 195.
190. Id. § 200.
191. Id. § 201.
192. Id. § 204.
193. Id. § 205.
194. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 207.
195. I § 198(2).
196. Id. § 199(2).
197. Id. § 202(2).
198. Id. § 203.
199. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), § 206.
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sections are simply the Reporter's view of the result that would usually
follow from using that approach. For particular types of contracts, all of the
presumptions are subject to displacement if some other state has a more
significant relationship to the parties and the transaction under the principles
stated in section 6, and most of the particular issues are determined by the
law selected by application of section 188. It is obviously important to
understand just how a court should go about identifying the state of most
significant relationship using sections 6 and 188.
Section 188(2) says that the five enumerated contacts are to be taken
into account in applying the principles of section 6 to determine the applica-
ble law. But exactly how do sections 6 and 188 interrelate? The comments
to section 188 offer considerable guidance on this point. The comment to
section 188(2) states that
the forum, in applying the principles of § 6 to determine the state of
most significant relationship, should give consideration to the rele-
vant policies of all potentially interested states and the relative in-
terests of those states in the decision of the particular issue. The
states which are most likely to be interested are those which have
one or more of the following [five] contacts with the transaction or
the parties. 2W
This language is an obvious reference to the interest analysis provisions of
section 6-section 6(2)(b) and (c). The comment to section 188(1) makes
this clear by saying that these two principles of section 6 focus "upon the
purposes, policies, aims and objectives of each of the competing local law
rules urged to govern and upon the concern of the potentially interested
states in having their rules applied. The factors ... are at times referred to as
'state interests' or as appertaining to an 'interested state.,, 201  The five
contacts, then, are important not in themselves, but because of the likelihood
that a state having one or more of these contacts with the parties or the
transaction will have an interest in the application of its law.
The appropriate starting point is therefore with the interest analysis
provisions of section 6. A court should first identify the relevant policy
underlying the law of each state having one or more of the five contacts with
the case. It should then ask whether that state's policy would be furthered by
application of its law. If the answer is yes, that state will be interested in the
200. Id. § 188(2) cmt. e.
201. Id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
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application of its law. The majority of cases, as Currie demonstrated, will be
false conflicts because only one state will have such an interest. 2 In that
event, the only interested state will presumably be the state of most signifi-
cant relationship. The comments to section 6 say that a state's interest in the
application of its law is a "weighty reason" favoring such application.
20 3
They do not actually state the converse proposition-that courts should not
apply the law of a state having no interest in such application-but there can
be little doubt that the basic philosophy of the Restatement, in common with
most of the other modem approaches, is to resolve false conflicts by appli-
cation of the law of the only interested state. Professor Reese has said
elsewhere that "a court should seek to avoid applying a law whose underly-
ing policy would not be served by such application." 2°4
This is certainly the easiest and most practical way to proceed. The
interest analysis provisions of section 6 may, without more, identify the state
of most significant relationship; if the conflict is false, the only interested
state will be that state. This, in turn, makes it unnecessary to consider the
other choice-influencing considerations of section 6 or to consult any of the
sections dealing with particular types of contracts and issues in contract
since the interest analysis principles of section 6 will have overridden any
contrary result that these sections might call for.
Up to this point, the method of the Restatement is clear enough.
Matters become more complex, however, if the interest analysis called for by
sections 6(2)(b) and (c) reveals that both states are interested in the applica-
tion of their laws-a true conflict, in other words. The comments to section
6 say that the state whose interests are "most deeply affected" should have
its law applied, 205 but nothing is said, there or elsewhere, about how this
determination is to be made. The Restatement leaves a court at this point
with a jumble of contacts, principles, policy-oriented provisions, and
jurisdiction-selecting rules to sort through and no guidance on how to do it.
One thing seems clear. The Restatement invites a court to do what
Brainerd Currie said neither could nor should be done, and that is to weigh
or compare the respective interests of two states in the application of their
202. See CURRIE, supra note 98, at 107.
203. RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. e.
204. Reese, supra note 161, at 510 (citation omitted). See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL, supra
note 3, at 245-51; ScoLEs & HAY, supra note 60, at 583-88; William A. Reppy, Jr., Eclecti-
cism in Choice of Law: Hybrid Method or Mishmash?, 34 MERCER L. REV. 645, 647-48 &
n.12 (1983); see generally CRAMTON uT AL., supra note 3, at 193-379 (summarizing principal
modem approaches); SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 15-41.
205. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
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laws. Currie, whose proposal it first was that conflicts cases be analyzed in
terms of governmental interests, deplored the weighing of interests as a way
of choosing between the competing laws and policies of two states. If both
states were interested, he said, no one, not even the Supreme Court, was in a
position to say which state's policies were "the more important, or the more
deserving, or the more enlightened." 2°6 Yet the Restatement's most basic
premise-that for every case there is a state of most significant relation-
ship-requires a court to make this relative judgment. Any state interested
in the application of its law will have a significant relationship to a case. If
two states have such a relationship, there appears to be no escape from
determining in some way that one state's relationship is more significant
than the other's. In effect, the Restatement assumes its own conclusion: one
state's relationship must be more significant than another's because there
must be a state of most significant relationship.
The Restatement's failure to say how a court is supposed to make this
determination opens a Pandora's box of possibilities. Courts as unimpressed
with Currie's arguments as the Reporter, apparently will undoubtedly try to
assess the degree to which the interested states are attached to the policies
embodied in their laws as a measure of whose interests are "most deeply
affected. 2 °7  Some policies will no doubt strike some courts as more
strongly held than others, but this will necessarily be an individual and
highly subjective judgment, much like that involved with traditional methods
in deciding whether to invoke the public policy exception. In practice it has
proven difficult enough for a forum court to make that judgment with respect
to its own state's public policy, 208 much less compare its degree of "strength"
with that of another state in any meaningful way.
206. CURRIE, supra note 98, at 117.
207. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
208. In Lilienthal v. Kaufinan, 395 P.2d 543, 548 (Or. 1964), Justice Denecke made the
following, refreshingly candid observation:
The difficulty in deciding what is the fundamental law forming a cornerstone
of the forum's jurisprudence and what is not such fundamental law, thus allow-
ing it to give way to foreign law, is caused by the lack of any even remotely ob-
jective standards. Former limitations on the capacity of married women to con-
tract illustrate the difficulty. Milliken v. Pratt, 125 Mass. 374 (1878), is used in
many case books as an example. There, the Massachusetts court held that the
Massachusetts law that a Massachusetts married woman was incapable of con-
tracting as a surety was not such a cornerstone of Massachusetts jurisprudence
and economy that Maine law to the contrary could not be applicable. However,
in Union Trust Co. v. Grosman, 245 U.S. 412 (1918), Mr. Justice Holmes, writ-
ing for the court, held that a similar Texas limitation on a Texas married woman
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In this sort of calculus, policies that coincide with a court's own sense
of values are likely to appear more strongly held than those that do not, and
it will be tempting to credit a state with little attachment to a policy that
seems wrong-headed or archaic or that is plainly on its way out, as was the
case with Massachusetts's protective policy in Milliken v. Pratt.209 It will
also be difficult for a court to ignore the result that application of the one
law or the other will produce in a given case, for once the content of com-
peting laws is taken into account, weighing interests almost inevitably
shades into weighing results. Courts that think they know a good socio-
economic result when they see one will have a field day with the Restate-
ment's "most deeply affected" 210 formulation.
Another possibility is contact counting. New York's adoption of the
"grouping of contacts" approach has had a fair measure of influence with
other courts.211 This approach counts "significant contacts" in an attempt to
locate the state "having the most interest in the problem" or "most intimately
concerned with the outcome."212 Its simple arithmetic creates an aura of
objectivity that courts, unwilling to engage in the unseemly business of
interest weighing, may find appealing. Although the similarity in terminol-
ogy makes it easy to guess that the Reporter took a few leaves from New
York's book in designing the Second Restatement, the comments to section
188(2) never say that the five contacts of the section are quantitatively
important; they are important only because they are likely to be the ones that
implicate a state's interest in the application of its law under the principles
of section 6. "Interest" in this sense means that the relevant policies em-
bodied in the law would be furthered by its application. A state is either
interested or it is not-not more or less interested depending on the number
was such an integral part of Texas policy that the Illinois law to the contrary
would not be enforced in a Texas court.
Compare Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp., 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967) (holding that
the historical absence of any limitation on wrongful death damages in the Florida wrongful
death statute falls to reflect strongly held public policy), with Gillen v. United Services Auto.
Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (holding that the statutory prohibition of "other insurance"
clauses in automobile insurance policies issued in Florida reflects strongly held public policy).
209. 125 Mass. 374 (1878).
210. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
211. See, e.g., SCOLES & HAY, supra note 60, at 691-93 ("[A] significant number [of
states] have adopted the more flexible center-of-gravity approach or that of the Second
Restatement"); Kay, supra note 119, at 535 ("North Dakota appears to be the only state that
has adopted New York's center of gravity approach without merging it into the 'most
significant relationship' doctrine of the Restatement Second."). See generally id. at 525-38.
212. Auten v. Auten, 124 N.E.2d 99, 102 (N.Y. 1954) (citations omitted).
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of contacts it has with a case. All the same, confronted with a true conflict
of interests and stuck for a way to break the tie, some courts will turn to
contact counting in the intuitively appealing if analytically superficial belief
that the interests of the state with the most contacts must be those that are
"most deeply affected. ' 13
For courts that understand Currie's objections and take them seriously,
the inexorable demand of the Restatement to locate the state of most signifi-
cant relationship will pose a thornier dilemma. Currie's own proposal-that
the forum apply its own law in a case of true conflict-was essentially
arbitrary, intended for a problem not capable of solution with the resources
at hand, but for which a solution nevertheless had to be found. Lilienthal is
a perfect example, but few courts have followed its lead,214  apparently
regarding a forum-law solution as too self-serving to commend itself as a
settled rule of decision. Certainly the Restatement lends no support to
Currie's proposal, but it does contain other possibilities for courts that value
arbitrary solutions in preference to the "apples and oranges" comparison
involved in interest weighing.
Professor Russell Weintraub has proposed that true conflicts be re-
solved by applying the law that validates the parties' agreement. 215  "It
makes sense," he says, "to have a choice-of-law rule in accord with widely
shared and clearly discernible trends in the domestic laws whose conflicts
we are trying to resolve., 216  In this, of course, he draws on the near-
sacrosanct status that contracts have enjoyed throughout the nation's history
and the well-known predilection of courts for enforcing them wherever
possible. Ample support for this result-essentially that argued for by all
proponents of the rule of validation2 7-can be found in the principles of
section 6. Choosing the validating law protects the justified expectations of
the parties and serves their need for certainty and predictability. This in turn
213. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
214. See Kay, supra note 119, at 551.
215. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 386-98. His proposal is more complex than the
statement in the text suggests; it is limited to questions of contract validity and is intended to
operate as a presumption subject to rebuttal in certain cases. "[F]acilitating the planning of
interstate and international commercial transactions," he says, "is far better served by a
rebuttable presumption that the contract will be valid under the local law of any contact state
provided that the validating policies underlying that law will be advanced by application to the
interstate transaction in issue." Id. at 387.
216. Id. at 359 (referencing torts cases); see also id. at 388.
217. See, e.g., EHRENZWEIG, supra note 63, at 465-90; STUMBERG, supra note 90, at 237-
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furthers the basic policy underlying the field of contract law. Such an
approach is simple and easy to use and, considering that most cases have
come out this way anyhow, could hardly cause disruption in the smooth
workings of the interstate system.
The other obvious possibility is simply a default reference to the
presumptions and suggested answers of the sections that follow section 188.
These black-letter rules represent the Reporter's attempt to distill for each
kind of contract and issue in contract the one particular territorial contact
that courts themselves have tended to emphasize in their choice-of-law
determinations. Since many of the decisions from which these rules derive
were made with territorial methods, it is not surprising to find the place of
contracting and the place of performance figuring prominently as the
important contacts. The net effect, somewhat ironically, is a more highly
refined and particularized version of the lex loci contractus doctrine. The
territorial bias of these sections reflects the Reporter's own view of the
profound and continuing importance of territoriality in conflicts thinking.
He has said elsewhere that to ignore the significance of territoriality is "to
ignore the basic reason for the existence of choice of law."218 These sections
also reflect his personal preference for a rule-based approach rather than one
that is open-ended and policy-oriented.219
For some, perhaps many courts, the appeal of an approach of this sort
should not be underestimated. In saying this, I have in mind the kind of
court that might approach a case in this way.220 Suppose it has determined
through the interest analysis provisions of section 6 that both states are
legitimately interested in the application of their laws. It recognizes, with
Currie, that it is in no position to "weigh" these conflicting interests. It
cannot say that one state is more deeply committed than the other to the
policies embodied in its law, or that the policies of one are more strongly
held or are somehow better, wiser, or more important than the other.
Contact counting strikes it as too simplistic, subjective, and uncertain.
Contacts, after all, can be multiplied and manipulated, and in practice
218. Reese, supra note 161, at 514.
219. See Willis L.M. Reese, Choice of Law: Rules or Approach, 57 CORNEtLL. REv. 315
(1972).
220. In discussing choice-of-law methodology, I assume throughout, for the sake of
simplicity, that only two states are involved and that the action is brought in the courts of one
of them. This is in fact far more often the case than not. But it is of course possible that a
conflicts case can involve more than two states, and it is also possible that the forum will be
"disinterested"--that is, its only connection with the case is that the parties have chosen to
litigate there.
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someone has to decide which ones are to be counted, whether some are more
important than others, and what happens if the contacts are more or less
evenly divided between the two states.
What the court feels the need for at this point is an arbitrary solution. It
wants a way of deciding that does not involve the appearance of deciding.
Its instinct, however, is for a method that will be as. impartial and free from
bias as possible, much like the simple toss of a coin. Hence, it rejects both
Currie's and Weintraub's proposals because, though arbitrary, each takes a
bias already present in these cases-one favoring application of forum law,
the other favoring the law that would validate the contract-and reintroduces
it into the process as a basis of decision. Like many courts, this court also
happens to be busy and overworked. With its crowded docket, it has neither
the time nor the inclination to make a "three-dimensional chess game' 221 of
these cases. It wants a quick, simple, and easy way to dispose of the case
before it and all others likely to arise, both for its own sake and that of the
lower courts who look to it for guidance. With a view to minimizing rather
than encouraging litigation, it wants a method that is certain and predictable
so that affected parties can suitably orient their actions and attorneys can
advise their clients with confidence. What this court wants, in short, is a
simple and easy-to-use approach that will be impartial in operation, certain,
and predictable in result. For these purposes the black-letter rules of the
specific sections should do nicely.
I want to emphasize that the suggested use of the Restatement in this
way is intended only for true conflict resolution. The first step in any case
should always be to determine the nature of the conflict by relating the
contacts of section 188(2) to the interest analysis provisions of section 6. If
the conflict is false, the law of the only interested state should be applied.
Only if it is true should the territorial contact identified in the appropriate
specific section be used and then only for the limited purpose of providing
an arbitrary way of resolving the conflict.
The Reporter supports his choice of particular contacts with a rationale
in the comments that accompany each black-letter rule, often to the extent of
saying that a certain state, by virtue of its territorial connection, is likely to
222have a "dominant" or "natural" interest in the determination of an issue.
This line of thought revives the territorial bias of the original Restatement in
an unfortunate way, attaching as it does near-talismanic significance to some
221. Rosenberg, supra note 81, at 644.
222. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 192 cmt. c (dominant interest);
id. § 193 cmt. c (natural interest); id. § 196 cmt. c (natural interest).
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one particular contact. The danger is that the state with the identified
contact may have no interest in the application of its law. A court can miss
this important point altogether if it omits the interest analysis step and
simply consults the black-letter rules directly. The point here has nothing to
do with the soundness of the Reporter's reasons for singling out a particular
contact; it is that those reasons, sound or otherwise, are essentially irrelevant
when the black-letter rules are used as default solutions for cases of true
conflict.
If all of this seems complex, it is a complexity inherent in the design of
the Restatement. Obviously it is not the monolith its predecessor was. It is
an agglomeration of just about every approach to choice-of-law that anyone
has ever thought of, and its eclectic assortment of contacts, principles,
policy-oriented provisions, and jurisdiction-selecting rules can accommodate
just about any approach a court might want to take. It is like an Erector set
with no directions. The only attempt at a unifying conception is the notion
of "a state of most significant relationship," yet that term is never defined.
Interest analysis is a major component, but its function and importance in
relation to other components are left unclear. In particular, no guidance is
provided for the critical case where each of two concerned states is legiti-
mately interested in the application of its law. There is only the unhelpful
assurance that one state must be more interested than the other because there
must be a state of most significant relationship. How that determination is to
be made is never specified. Nowhere does the Restatement confront Cur-
rie's central insight that a court of one state may have no business in making
that sort of relative judgment between its own law and policy and that of
another state.
Let me illustrate these concerns by returning to Lilienthal in order to
consider how a court might work through the Second Restatement in
deciding that case. It would probably start by referring to section 195, which
deals with "contracts for the repayment of money lent."223 That section
states that the governing law is that of the state "where the contract requires
that repayment be made,"224 which in this case would be California. Ergo,
the contract is valid and should be enforced against Kaufman, the Oregon
spendthrift. With this, we are essentially back to the traditional territorial
approach-albeit in a more refined version-and all the simplicity, ease,
certainty, and predictability that it affords. Some courts have taken just this
223. See id. § 195.
224. Id.
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approach, using the black-letter rules to the exclusion of everything else. 25
But there is a catch if the court reads carefully. Section 195 directs it to
apply California law unless some other state has a more significant relation-
ship to the transaction and the parties under the principles of section 6.226
What is a "significant relationship"? The term is not defined. Does Califor-
nia have one, or Oregon either, for that matter?
In search of guidance, the court might turn back to the general principle
of section 188(1), which only repeats the admonition to apply the law of the
state having the most significant relationship to the transaction and the
parties under the principles of section 6.227 Section 188(2) is more specific.
It says that in applying those principles, the court should take account of five
contacts .28 California has four. They are the place of contracting, the place
of negotiation, the place of performance, and the domicile of the lender.
Oregon has, at most, two. They are the location of the subject matter of the
contract-presumably the money lent-and also the domicile of the debtor.
But quantity is not the issue. The comments instruct the court, in
applying the principles of section 6, to consider the relevant policies of all
potentially interested states.22 9 They add that the states "likely to be inter-
ested are those.. .hav[ing] one or more" of the five contacts with the transac-
tion or the parties. 230 California's policy is one of security of transactions.
Application of its law would further that policy by enforcing the contract and
thereby insuring that its resident creditor is paid. Oregon is likewise an
interested state. Its legislatively determined policy is one of protecting
resident spendthrifts by relieving them of their contractual obligations.
Application of Oregon law would plainly serve that end.
What now? Both states are interested states. The comments to section
6 say that generally the law of the state whose interests are "most deeply
affected" should be applied,23' but unfortunately there are no directions on
how to make this determination. Nor is there anything to warn the court that
perhaps it is not its proper role to say that policies arrived at by its own
225. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 132 ("Other courts. essentially end their
analysis with the rules: little or no attention is paid to § 6, and instead the court makes the
presumption effectively irrebuttable. For these courts the Second Restatement is little more
than an updated version of the first.").
226. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 195.
227. See id. § 188(1).
228. See id. § 188(2).
229. See id. cmt. e.
230. Id.
231. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. f.
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legislature after full debate and consideration should yield to those of
California, or, for that matter, that California's should yield to Oregon's.
Some sort of resolution, of course, is not hard to come by. The point is that
the result reached, whatever it is, will necessarily represent a subjective
judgment that depends far more on the court's attitude and temperament than
on anything contained in the Restatement.
Compelled by the Restatement to make this relative judgment, how
should the court go about it? It knows, of course, that both Oregon and
California share a strong interest in the security of transactions, which in this
context means that contractual obligations should be enforced and, more
specifically, that debtors should be required to pay their debts. But the
Oregon Legislature, though well aware of this precept and generally in full
agreement with it, has nevertheless seen fit to carve out a special exception
for a discrete group of Oregonians who, by reason of psychiatric or person-
ality disorder, cannot control their compulsion to spend money. For their
own protection and the protection of those close to them, the legislature has
empowered courts to declare such persons spendthrifts, the practical effect
of which is to deprive them of the power to enter into valid contracts.
In other words, the Oregon Legislature has already struck the very
balance that the court is wrestling with: for the special class of persons
known as spendthrifts, it has determined that Oregon's interest in protecting
them takes priority over its more general interest in enforcing contracts. The
court also knows that the number of Oregonian spendthrifts is small, espe-
cially in relation to the number of potential debtors, and that it will not be
called upon very often to depart from the normal practice in order to protect
them. Enforcing the contract will therefore have a much greater impact on
the policy of protecting spendthrifts than not enforcing it will have on the
policy of security of transactions.232 Not only would enforcement deal a
serious blow to Oregon's protective scheme, but it would also require the
court to second-guess the legislature in order to do it. From this sort of
perspective, Oregon's interests might well strike the court as more deeply
affected than California's interests.
On the other hand, consider how easily a court with a different set of
values could reach the opposite result. It could reinforce California's
interest in the application of its law by counting contacts and concluding that
it is the center of gravity, hence the state most intimately concerned with the
outcome and, thus, the state whose interests are most deeply affected. Or it
232. See Kramer, supra note 87, at 323-24.
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could bring into play the other choice-influencing considerations of section
6, which, for contracts cases, boil down to enforcing agreements in order to
protect the justified expectations of the parties, thereby promoting certainty
and predictability and insuring that the interstate system continues to hum
along. Alternatively, if already at odds with its legislature, it could sniff
condescendingly and point out that Oregon's spendthrift policy is a legisla-
tive aberration, undoubtedly intended only for home consumption, and
therefore weak in comparison with California's policy of enforcing contrac-
tual obligations. California has a policy shared, not coincidentally, by
Oregon as well as most other states in the United States. On the other hand,
it could simply acknowledge the impasse and break the tie in an arbitrary
way with section 195's presumption that the governing law is that of
California, the state where the money was to be repaid.
Ironically, the one solution not readily available to a Second Restate-
ment court is the one actually adopted in Lilienthal. The Restatement
requires a court to determine that one state's relationship is more significant
than another's and then in some way to rationalize that determination. For a
court that thinks like the Lilienthal court, this will necessitate a degree of
dishonesty, or at least sophistry, for it will not be able to say, as the Oregon
Supreme Court did, that the policies of both states are important and would
be equally affected by non-application of their respective laws. Nor will it
be able to acknowledge forthrightly that it is an instrument of state policy
with a sworn constitutional duty to uphold the laws and policies of its own
state wherever possible.
It seems obvious that value judgments are involved here. To some
courts, separation-of-powers and role-and-function concerns will carry little
weight. It will not matter that they are dealing with the laws of two sover-
eigns; they will be only too happy to engage in the familiar task of weighing
and balancing competing considerations of social and economic interest to
reach what they think is a sound result, just as if the case were a run-of-the-
mill domestic one. Others may take pause, struck with the seriousness of
what it means to have to nullify, if only for one case, the laws and policies of
their own state. It is a decision as profound in its way as one declaring a
statute unconstitutional, and they will not be happy making it just because
the Restatement says so.
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IV. TEMPERAMENT AND ATTITUDE IN THE FLORIDA COURT'S DECISION
MAKING IN CHOICE-OF-LAW CASES
The Restatement's assortment of riches makes it an extraordinarily
flexible instrument for the resolution of conflicts problems. It contains
something for everybody, and it is not surprising that it has become the most
popular of the modem approaches as a replacement for traditional meth-
ods. 33 A number of commentators have pointed out, however, that the
results it has produced around the country thus far have not been noticeably
certain, predictable, or uniform, or even very satisfactory; 423 rather, they bear
out the assertion that the use that any particular court makes of the Restate-
ment is more likely to depend on what it values in a choice-of-law method
than on the Restatement itself.
In considering the desirability of extending the Restatement approach in
Florida, the most pertinent question to ask, it seems to me, is what the
Supreme Court of Florida values in a choice-of-law method. Obviously
there can be no definitive answer to this question. The court's membership
has changed frequently over time,235 and what it has done in the past is no
guarantee of what it will do in the future. All the same, there are marked
indications of attitude and temperament in the court's pattern of decision
making in conflicts cases over the years, especially in the torts cases it has
decided thus far with the approach of the Second Restatement. An examina-
tion of this history in some detail should prove instructive.
Drama in the conflicts arena usually comes when a court manipulates
the choice-of-law decision in order to produce what it obviously thinks is the
right result for the case before it. The bolder and more imaginative the
manipulation, the better, as witness the conjuring-act quality of the best of
233. See, e.g., WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 377 & n.43; Borchers, Choice of Law in the
American Courts in 1992: Observations and Reflections, 42 AM. J. COMp. L. 125, 129-33
(1992).
234. See, e.g., Kay, supra note 119, at 558-62; Kramer, supra note 29, at 466, 486-89;
Laycock, supra note 29, at 253; Sedler, The Contracts Provisions of the Restatement
(Second): An Analysis and a Critique, 72 COLUM. L. REV. 279, 327-28 (1972); Singer, supra
note 29, at 77.
235. Of the seven justices who participated in the 1980 decision in Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co., 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980), in which the court adopted the Second
Restatement approach for torts cases, only two Justices, Justices Overton and McDonald, were
still on the court in 1988 when Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988) was decided.
Of the justices who participated in that decision, four Justices, Chief Justice Kogan and
Justices Grimes, Shaw, and Overton remain on the court today.
19971
55
Southerland: Conflict of Laws in Florida: The Desirability of Extending the Se
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
Justice Roger Traynor's opinions for the California Supreme Court.2 36 But if
that sort of performance has been the stuff of soap opera, then the Supreme
Court of Florida's opinions, by comparison, have tended to resemble the
weather report on the nightly news.
The most innovative of these was, undoubtedly, Justice Robert's short-
lived 1967 opinion in Hopkins v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp.,237 a case arising
out of the death of a Florida resident in an airline crash in Illinois. In the
ensuing wrongful death action, brought in federal court in Tampa and
sounding in both tort and contract, the Supreme Court of Florida was asked
by way of certified question to say whether Florida, for reasons of public
policy or otherwise, would refuse to apply an Illinois limitation on wrongful
death damages, Florida having none.238
Writing for five members of the court, Justice Roberts found in earlier
cases a strongly expressed policy of giving "primary consideration, in
choice-of-law cases, to the public policy-legislative as well as organic-or
'any salutary interest' of this state and to decline to enforce a foreign law
when contrary thereto .... ,,239 But he did not stop with that. He went on to
declare that "the strict lex loci delicti rule should be abandoned in favor of a
more flexible rule which permits analysis of the policies and interests
underlying the particular issue before the court.,,240 He quoted with apparent
approval the "most significant relationship" principle from a tentative draft
of the Second Restatement2 4' and stressed the importance of analyzing:
[T]he policies underlying and the purpose of the conflicting laws
and of the relationship of the occurrence and of the parties to such
policies and purpose. By giving full effect to the law of a foreign
state when-and only when-such purposes or policies would be
served or effectuated, the forum state does, as a practical matter,
accord due 'deference and respect' to such foreign law .... 242
236. See People v. One 1953 Ford Victoria, 311 P.2d 480 (Cal. 1957); Grant v. McAu-
liffe, 264 P.2d 944 (Cal. 1953).
237. 201 So. 2d 743 (Fla. 1967).
238. Id. at 744-45.
239. Id. at 747.
240. Id.
241. See id. at 747 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 379(1) (Tentative
Draft No. 9, 1964)).
242. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 747.
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He failed to see that the happenstance of a plane crash in Illinois gave that
state any interest in the application of its law and concluded that Florida
would refuse to apply the Illinois limitation on wrongful death damages.
243
But on rehearing, the court reversed itself.244 A new majority of four
plainly thought the Illinois wrongful death statute the only one applicable.
245
It could find no basis in the rules of statutory interpretation for separating the
damage limitation from the underlying right to sue and posed the issue
squarely in terms of whether such a limitation was so repugnant to Florida's
statutory policy of unlimited damages as to be unenforceable. With no
discussion, it found that it was not.246 The New York Court of Appeals'
controversial decision in Kilberg v. Northeast Airlines, Inc.,247 in which that
court had done precisely what the court here was refusing to do, was sharply
distinguished in a footnote as basing its contrary conclusion on a constitu-
tional rather than a statutory prohibition of damage limitations. 248 And, in
the majority's view, any discussion of tort conflicts doctrine was inappropri-
ate in a case "explicitly characterized" as a warranty proceeding.
249
In its wooden and mechanical insistence on territorial principles, the
final opinion in Hopkins is the typical one. Whatever policy the absence of
damage limitations in Florida's wrongful death statute reflected, it was not
strong enough to override the normally applicable territorial rule that
wrongful death damages are a function of the law of the place of wrong.2
As a result, Florida's policy, and with it the claim of a Florida resident to the
protection of that policy, was subordinated to that of another state. The bias
so often apparent in these cases-the tendency of the forum to choose its
own law, particularly when that law would allow an injured plaintiff to
recover, and particularly when the plaintiff happens to be a forum resi-
dent25-was entirely missing. No one reading the final opinion could
accuse the court of result-oriented decision-making. With the abrupt
reversal, Justice Roberts lost his bid to place Florida in the forefront of the
choice-of-law revolution, which had erupted only five years earlier with the
243. Id. at 747-48.
244. Id. at 749.
245. See id. at 751.
246. Id.
247. 172 N.E.2d 526 (N.Y. 1961).
248. Hopkins, 201 So. 2d at 751 n.3.
249. Id. at 751.
250. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT, supra note 74, § 417 (1934).
251. See, e.g., Kom, supra note 6, at 780.
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New York Court of Appeals' watershed decision in Babcock v. Jackson.
252
More significantly, it was the first and last time that the Supreme Court of
Florida would speak in the language of interest analysis in a conflict-of-laws
case.
Despite the importance claimed by Justice Roberts for the public policy
exception in Florida's conflicts jurisprudence, it has never been invoked in a
torts case; and in contracts cases it has been used only infrequently, espe-
25
cially in recent years. The most notable example is Gillen v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n,24 decided in 1974, which involved an "other
insurance" clause in an automobile insurance policy. The clause was valid
in New Hampshire where the policy was issued and delivered and the
Gillens were resident at the time, but invalid in Florida where, with notice to
the insurer, they had permanently relocated and were living when Mr. Gillen
was killed and Mrs. Gillen seriously injured in a collision caused solely by
the negligence of an uninsured motorist.25 5 In an opinion by Justice Adkins,
the court refused to give effect to the clause, declaring that public policy
"requires this Court to assert Florida's paramount interest in protecting its
own from inequitable insurance arrangements. 2 56
Justice Adkins never said why the statutorily based public policy in this
case was strongly held whereas that in Hopkins was not, illustrating once
again the subjectivity inherent in the exception. The solicitude expressed for
Florida's policies and its residents would be more striking were Gillen not
such an isolated instance. The result should not obscure the fact that in most
of its conflicts decisions the court has been content to apply the traditional
territorial rules in mechanical fashion, letting the chips fall where they may.
The same kinds of considerations that underlie the public policy
exception are present in the interest analysis provisions of section 6, but they
have received remarkably short shrift in the cases which the court has
decided since 1980 when it adopted the Second Restatement approach for
252. 191 N.E.2d 279 (N.Y. 1963).
253. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974); Cemiglia
v. C & D Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d I (Fla. 1967); Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla.
1956); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 199 So. 50 (Fla. 1940). Despite specific
urging, the court refused to invoke the exception in Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami,
Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985); Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank
& Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981); and Continental Mortgage Investors v. Sailboat
Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981).
254. 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
255. Id. at 4-5.
256. Id. at 7.
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torts cases in Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co.257 In fact, it would be
fair to say that the Restatement itself has received remarkably short shrift at
the hands of the court.
Bishop itself was an easy case, a paradigm false conflict, which the
court used only as a vehicle for abandoning its traditional adherence to lex
loci delicti and adopting the approach of the Second Restatement instead. It
seems safe to say that had the court reached the merits, it would have applied
Florida law. Members of the Bishop family, all Florida residents, were
guests aboard a small airplane leased and operated by Florida Specialty
Paint, a Florida corporation. They were flying to North Carolina for a
holiday weekend. The plane, piloted by the company's president, also a
Florida resident, crashed en route in South Carolina, allegedly due to the
pilot's negligence. The Bishops brought suit in Florida against the company
and its president to recover for their injuries. An airplane guest statute was
in effect in South Carolina that required guests to show intentional miscon-
duct or recklessness on the part of their host in order to recover. Florida had
no such statute and required only a showing of simple negligence.
258
A quick section 6 analysis would have revealed that South Carolina had
no interest in the application of its airplane guest statute, the purpose of
which was the protection of hosts from suits by ungrateful guests and the
elimination of collusive lawsuits3 9 The intended beneficiaries of this policy
were South Carolina residents and the insurance carriers who insured them,
none of whom were present in the case. Florida, in contrast, was interested
in the application of its law to further its policy of full compensation for
negligently inflicted injuries. As Florida was the only interested state, its
law should have been applied.260
Since Bishop there have been only three cases-State Farm Mutual
Automobile Insurance Co. v. Olsen,261 Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo,262 and Celotex
Corp. v. Meehan263-but they have a good deal to say about what the court
values in a choice-of-law method. And because the torts and contracts
provisions of the Restatement are so similar,264 these cases offer consider-
257. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980).
258. Id. at 1000.
259. Cf Ramey v. Ramey, 258 S.E.2d 883, 884-85 n.5 (S.C. 1979).
260. See Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 486-89.
261. 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
262. 453 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
263. 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988).
264. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188. Compare id. section 145
(stating "The General Principle" for torts cases). Section 145 provides:
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able insight into the use to which the court might put the Restatement, were
it to extend its approach to contracts cases.
265
Olsen was decided in 1981 and arose out of a 1976 car accident in
Illinois between an Illinois uninsured motorist and Johnnie Olsen, a Florida
resident, who died from injuries sustained in the crash. Both drivers were
negligent in some unspecified degree. At the time of the accident, Illinois
was still a contributory negligence state; Florida had recently adopted pure
comparative negligence. Under the uninsured motorist provisions of Olsen's
insurance policy with State Farm, his widow was entitled to recover from the
company the damages that she was "legally entitled to recover" from the
Illinois uninsured motorist. Whether she could recover from that person
turned in the court's view on whose law would govern if she actually
brought such a suit.
266
The court held that Illinois law controlled. 267 It singled out and rein-
forced with italics the presumptive place-of-injury language of section 146268
and reiterated Bishop's cautionary injunction that the state of injury "would,
(1) The rights and liabilities of the parties with respect to an issue in tort are de-
termined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue, has the
most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties under the princi-
ples stated in § 6.
(2) Contacts to be taken into account in applying the principles of § 6 to deter-
mine the law applicable to an issue include:
(a) the place where the injury occurred,
(b) the place where the conduct causing the injury occurred,
(c) the domicil, residence, nationality, place of incorporation and place of
business of the parties, and
(d) the place where the relationship, if any, between the parties is centered.
These contacts are to be evaluated according to their relative importance with re-
spect to the particular issue.
Id. Section 145 is followed by a number of specific sections dealing with particular torts and
important issues in tort. In most instances these rules call for application of the law of the
state where injury occurred unless the principles of section 6 displace that law.
265. For a more detailed treatment of these three cases, see Southerland supra note 5, at
817-27, 847-63; Southerland &Waxman, supra note 1, at 497-512. The discussion in text is
drawn largely from these sources.
266. Olsen, 406 So. 2d at 1110.
267. Id. at 1111.
268. Id. Section 146, entitled "Personal Injuries," provides:
In an action for a personal injury, the local law of the state where the injury oc-
curred determines the rights and liabilities of the parties, unless, with respect to
the particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under the
principles stated in § 6 to the occurrence and the parties, in which event the local
law of the other state will be applied.
Id. at 1111 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 146).
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under most circumstances, be the decisive consideration in determining the
applicable choice of law."269 Illinois "certainly" had the most significant
relationship to the occurrence since the accident happened there.270 So far as
the "relevant policies" of section 6 were concerned, the court simply
asserted, without discussion, that Illinois' interest in protecting its resident
uninsured motorist from a subrogation suit by State Farm was "paramount to
the relevant policies of Florida as the forum state."271 It stressed throughout
the section 6 values of "certainty, predictability and uniformity of result" and
"ease in the determination and application of the law to be applied.' 272
Justice Adkins wrote the majority opinion, Justice Sundberg alone dissent-
ing.
Olsen was far more complex than the court's brief opinion made it
seem. It was a case with which a Second Restatement court with a different
set of values could have had a field day. It was first of all a case of true
conflict. Both states were interested in the application of their laws because
the policies of each would have been furthered by such application. Flor-
ida's policy, moreover, was not just any policy; it was one that plainly was
strongly held. When Olsen reached the Fifth District Court of Appeal, the
inflexible rule of lex loci delicti was still the law in Florida. That court
refused to apply the law of the place of injury, and instead invoked the
public policy exception to find that application of the contributory negli-
gence rule would offend Florida's public policy favoring comparative
negligence. 273 In this the court relied on Justice Adkins' majority opinion in
Hoffman v. Jones,274 the 1973 case in which Florida discarded contributory
negligence and adopted pure comparative negligence in its stead, roundly
condemning the rule as "unjust," "inequitable," "harsh," "wrong,"
"primitive," and no longer responsive to modem conditions.275 It also noted
the subsequent legislative recognition of the new rule in the Uniform
Contribution Among Tortfeasors Act of 1976.276 All of this, it said, clearly
269. Olsen, 406 So. 2d at 1111 (quoting Bishop v. Florida Specialty Paint Co., 389 So.
2d 999, 1001 (Fla. 1980)).
270. Id.
271. Id.
272. Id. (quoting Bishop, 389 So. 2d at 1001).
273. See Olsen v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 600, 601 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1980), quashed by 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
274. 280 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1973).
275. Id. at 436-37.
276. Olsen, 386 So. 2d at 601. See FLA. STAT. § 768.31(3)(a) (Supp. 1976).
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implied "that the concept of contributory negligence as a bar to recovery is
contrary to the public policy of this state.
' 277
Justice Adkins, the author not only of Hoffman but of Gillen too, passed
over this point in silence. It is true of course that the public policy exception
as such has no place in a Restatement analysis, but the considerations that
underlie it necessarily come into play in the assessment of policies and
interests called for by sections 6(2)(b) and (c), particularly for courts that
believe that state interests can be "weighed" in some way and then com-
pared. From this perspective, Florida's relevant policy was strong, but
Illinois' was not. Contributory negligence was on its last leg in that state.
Two months before the Olsen opinion appeared in slip-sheet form, the
Illinois Supreme Court repudiated contributory negligence and adopted pure
comparative negligence in its stead. 8
Moreover, Florida's interest in the application of its law to further its
policy could likewise be characterized as strong. Mrs. Olsen was a Florida
resident-a widow whose husband, also a Florida resident, had been
tortuously killed by an uninsured motorist. The application of Illinois law
would mean that she would recover nothing for her husband's death under an
insurance contract negotiated, issued, and paid for in the state of Florida,
insuring a risk principally centered here, and under which, without dispute,
she would have been able to recover had the accident occurred in Florida, or
for that matter in any number of other states. In all likelihood, the Olsens
purchased this coverage believing that it would protect them in the event of
an accident with an uninsured motorist. It strains belief to suppose that State
Farm ever told them that their right to recover might vary drastically de-
pending on the happenstance of where such an accident might occur.
By comparison, Illinois' interest in the application of its all but defunct
contributory negligence rule was virtually nil, especially in light of the fact
that the individual claiming its protection was driving without insurance,
almost surely in violation of his state's financial responsibility laws and very
possibly in violation of other laws as well. Justice Adkins expressed
concern for the rights of an Illinois resident subjected to a subrogation suit
by State Farm to recover any claim it might pay. A moment's thought makes
clear that the individual could never have been subjected to personal liability
even had Florida law been applied. Mrs. Olsen's right to recover against
State Farm turned on her hypothetical right to recover from the uninsured
277. Olsen, 386 So. 2d at 601.
278. See Alvis v. Ribar, 421 N.E.2d 886 (Ill. 1981). The Illinois Supreme Court liberally
and approvingly cited Hoffman. See id. at 888, 890, 895-97.
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motorist. Had she actually brought suit against that individual, the con-
tributory negligence doctrine would have barred her claim in Illinois, and she
could not have sued in Florida because there was no basis for obtaining
personal jurisdiction over the Illinois motorist. Any attempt by State Farm
to enforce its subrogation rights against the Illinois tortfeasor would have
foundered on these considerations. As a practical matter, the only loser had
Florida law been applied would have been State Farm.
These considerations make it easy to say that from almost any stand-
point of comparison-weight, strength, or degree of enlightenment-
Florida's interest in furthering its policy far outweighed that of Illinois and
that Florida's interests were therefore "more deeply affected." Olsen was a
case in which any court predisposed to "weighing" interests, to assessing the
wisdom of underlying policies or the strength with which those policies are
held, or to incorporating some or all of the familiar preferences for forum
law, recovery, and local residents in the search for "justice" in some larger
sense would have had no difficulty in rationalizing the application of Florida
law with the Second Restatement.
Florida's law and its policies likewise took a back seat in Hertz Corp. v.
Piccolo,279 decided in 1984. Frank Piccolo, a Florida resident, was injured in
Louisiana when his car was struck by a truck that had been rented in Louisi-
ana from the Hertz Corporation. Piccolo brought suit in Florida under the
Louisiana direct-action statute directly against Hertz as the insurer of the
truck to recover for his injuries. The alleged tortfeasor, a Tennessee resident
named John Kiern, was not joined in the action. The trial court dismissed
the complaint for failure to join an indispensable party, considering this a
procedural matter governed by Florida rather than Louisiana law. 0 The
first district reversed, holding that the issue was substantive and that the
Louisiana direct-action statute controlled.28'
The supreme court agreed and devoted most of the opinion to saying
why. But it said first that even if the question of joinder was substantive, it
would still be possible for Florida law to apply if Florida had a more
"significant relationship" to the issue under the Second Restatement ap-
proach adopted in Bishop. 282 Which state, then, had the "most significant
relationship?" The court made that complex choice-of-law determination in
279. 453 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
280. Id. at 13.
281. Piccolo v. Hertz Corp., 421 So. 2d 535 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1982), affid, 453 So.
2d 12 (Fla. 1984).
282. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 14.
1997]
63
Southerland: Conflict of Laws in Florida: The Desirability of Extending the Se
Published by NSUWorks, 1997
Nova Law Review
a single sentence: "clearly in the instant case Louisiana has a more signifi-
cant relationship to the issue than Florida.,
283
This unsupported and painfully brief assertion all but obscured the
profound conflict in underlying policies. Louisiana's direct-action statute in
terms permitted any person injured in Louisiana, resident or nonresident, to
sue the tortfeasor's insurance company directly.284 The real problem, never
mentioned by the majority, was focused by Justice Shaw in his dissent.285
Section 627.7262 of the Florida Statutes provided in pertinent part that
[i]t shall be a condition precedent to the accrual or maintenance of
a cause of action against a liability insurer by a person not an in-
sured under the terms of the liability insurance contract that such
person first obtain a judgment against a person who is an insured
under the terms of such policy for a cause of action which is cov-
ered by such policy.
286
The constitutionality of this statute had been upheld a few months earlier in
VanBibber v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Insurance Co.,28 7 ending, as
Justice Shaw observed, "some fourteen years of effort by this Court and the
legislature to resolve the issue of whether an injured party could concur-
rently sue both the insurer and the insured. 288 The relevant policy of the
statute, in other words, was about as forcefully hammered out, sharply
focused, and strongly held as a policy can be. That policy prohibited
precisely what the court allowed, the use of Florida courts for the mainte-
nance of a direct action against an insurance company.
Piccolo, like Olsen, was a true conflict, but one in a different pattern.289
Louisiana was interested in the application of its direct-action statute to
283. Id.
284. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 22:655 (West 1978). The statutory language is set out in
the margin of the opinion, Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 13 n.2. Compare Watson v. Employers
Liab. Assurance Corp., 348 U.S. 66, 72 (1954) ("Persons injured or killed in Louisiana are
most likely to be Louisiana residents, and even if not, Louisiana may have to care for them.").
285. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 16 (Shaw, J., dissenting).
286. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1) (Supp. 1982).
287. 439 So. 2d 880 (Fla. 1983).
288. Piccolo, 453 So. 2d at 16.
289. If a state's law is enacted for the benefit or protection of its own residents, then it
will be interested in the application of that law only when the party urging its application is
such a resident. Cases arise in which the parties are from different states, and each claims the
benefit of the other state's law. This, Currie said, was an "unprovided" case, because
"[n]either state cares what happens." CURRIE, supra note 98, at 152. A classic example is
Neumeier v. Kuehner, 286 N.E.2d 454 (N.Y. 1972), a case in which, as a result of an accident
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further its policy of protecting all persons tortuously injured in Louisiana,
even though Hertz, seen as a Louisiana resident, would be disadvantaged as
a result. Florida was similarly interested in the application of section
627.7262 to prevent the use of its courts for the maintenance of a direct
action against an insurer, even though such application would work to the
disadvantage of a Florida resident.
After these two cases, one had to wonder whether any policy embodied
in Florida law would ever be considered sufficiently strongly held or
important enough to override the place of injury as the decisive factor, at
least in a case of any difficulty. Indeed, for all the use made of it, it was hard
to see why the court adopted the Second Restatement approach in the first
place. The comments to section 6 counsel the forum to give consideration to
the policies and purposes of its own law, sayirig that if they would be
furthered by the law's application to out-of-state facts, "this is a weighty
reason why such application should be made."290 They likewise direct the
court to give the same consideration to the relevant policies of other con-
cerned states.291 Yet in neither case did the court do this, much less attempt
the relative determination that one state's interests were more deeply
affected than the other's. Instead, for the announced reasons of ease and
simplicity in decision making and certainty, predictability, and uniformity of
result, it simply followed the presumption of section 146, which is nothing
more than lex loci delicti by another name.
Both Olsen and Piccolo were true conflicts, the kinds of cases which, in
Currie's view, could not be resolved by any rational calculus. In light of the
results, it was at least possible to suppose that the court had imaginatively hit
in Ontario, an Ontario plaintiff sued a New York defendant in New York claiming the benefit
of New York's ordinary negligence standard, while the New York defendant sought the
application of Ontario's stricter gross negligence standard. The purposes of neither state's law
would have been furthered by its application. Critics have used the phenomenon of the
"unprovided" case to argue that interest analysis, as a choice-of-law method, is fundamentally
flawed. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 173. See generally id. at 171-75.
Piccolo, however, was not an "unprovided" case since the policies of both Florida and
Louisiana would have been furthered by the application of their laws. It is a good case with
which to make the point that a state's interest in the application of its law is not necessarily
tied to cases in which such application would benefit or protect its own residents. A statute or
common law rule may be intended by its makers to work to the disadvantage of the individual
residents of a state in order to further a public purpose of a different order. The only question
that interest analysis asks is whether the policy underlying a law would be furthered by its
application. See Sedler, supra note 87, at 624; see generally Bruce Posnak, Choice of Law-
Interest Analysis: They Still Don't Get it, 40 WAYNE L. REv. 1121 (1994).
290. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 6(2) cmt. e.
291. Id. at cmt. f.
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on the place of injury as an arbitrary solution for these difficult cases,
primarily for reasons of certainty, predictability, uniformity of result, and
simplification of the judicial task, but also as the most neutral and least
biased way of making the choice-of-law determination. There would have
been much to commend such an approach.292 It avoids the subjectivity that
always seems to infect the apples-and-oranges comparison of state interests,
and it is deferential to the legitimate interests of other states, thus contribut-
ing to the maintenance of interstate order and harmony. Commentators and
academicians are prone to discount the fact that courts are busy and over-
worked,293 and they often fail to appreciate the dilemmas that practicing
lawyers face in mapping litigation strategy and trying to give their clients
cost-effective advice. From this point of view, a simple and relatively
inflexible rule can be preferable to some more complex, cumbersome, and
less predictable approach.
Unfortunately, these considerable virtues were lost altogether in Celotex
Corp. v. Meehan,294 decided in 1988. In that case, the court managed to
transform the Restatement's "most significant relationship" approach into
the "significant relationships test.' 295  According to Justice Overton's
majority opinion, "[t]he criteria for determining whether significant relation-
ships exist" are the four contacts of section 145(2):296 1) the place of injury;
2) the place of the injury-causing conduct; 3) the domicile or residence of
the parties; and 4) the place where their relationship, if any, is centered.297
This amounted to the adoption of a contact-counting method in its simplest
possible form. After Meehan, presumably, one simply adds up the contacts
of section 145(2) by state and applies the law of the state with the most. It
would be a profound understatement to say that with this case the court left
292. See Southerland & Waxman, supra note 1, at 549-58; Southerland, supra note 5, at
815-17.
293. But see CURRM, supra note 98, at 629 n.2.
294. 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988). The case consolidated for argument and decision three
cases from the Third District Court of Appeal-Meehan v. Celotex Corp., 466 So. 2d 1100
(Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (revised panel opinion adopted on rehearing en bane); Nance v.
Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 466 So. 2d 1113 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985); and Colon v.
Celotex Corp., 465 So. 2d 1332 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1985)-all of which involved the
application of Florida's borrowing statute to claims arising out of asbestos-related injuries.
Meehan was the principal case. For a discussion of the facts and disposition in Nance and
Colon, see Southerland, supra note 5, at 851-52.
295. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144.
296. Id.
297. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 145(2). See supra note 264
(providing full text of section 145).
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conflicts resolution under the Second Restatement more muddled than it
found it.
Meehan is a perfect illustration of all that is wrong with contact
counting. The case involved the application of Florida's borrowing statute
to a claim arising out of an asbestos-related injury. Charles Meehan was
exposed to asbestos products while working at the Brooklyn Navy Yard in
New York from 1942 to 1944. At the time, he was a New York domiciliary
and continued to make his home there until 1969, when he moved perma-
nently to Florida. He had been a Florida domiciliary for eight years when, in
1977, he was diagnosed as having asbestosis and mesothelioma, a rare form
of lung cancer, both diseases caused by the inhalation of asbestos fibers. He
died from these diseases in 1978.298
In 1979 his wife, Carmella Meehan, filed a wrongful death suit in
Florida against the Celotex Corporation and a number of other defendants,
all corporations engaged in the manufacture and sale of asbestos products.299
Her action was brought on theories of strict liability, failure to warn,
breaches of implied warranty, and negligence.30 Celotex, a Delaware
corporation, had at some point after 1944 acquired the successor corporation
to the Philip Carey Corporation, which was the Ohio company that had
actually manufactured the asbestos products to which Meehan was exposed.
None of the asbestos products involved were manufactured in New York,
nor did any of the corporate defendants have its principal place of business
there. °1 Meehan's former employer was not named as a defendant.
Florida's borrowing statute, section 95.10, provides that a cause of
action that arises in another state and is barred there by the statute of
limitations cannot be maintained in Florida.0 2 Where Meehan's cause of
action arose was, therefore, the critical issue, and it was one on which the
domestic rules of New York and Florida differed sharply. Under New York
law, Meehan was injured when he was last exposed to asbestos during the
period 1942 to 1944; his cause of action arose at that point, and any claim
for damages resulting from this exposure was barred by the New York three-
298. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144.
299. Id.
300. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 852 n.327 (citation omitted).
301. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
302. See FLA. STAT. § 95.10 (1979). In 1987, while Meehan was pending, the supreme
court decided Bates v. Cook, Inc., 509 So. 2d 1112 (Fla. 1987), in which it determined that the
question of where a cause of action arose for borrowing statute purposes was substantive
rather than procedural, and was to be resolved under the "significant relationships test" of the
Second Restatement. Id. at 1114-15.
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year statute of limitations by 1947, at the latest.3 °3 The exposure rule, a
distinctly minority view, was not the law in Florida. Florida considered that
Meehan's cause of action arose when he knew or should have known that he
had been injured.0 4 If that event occurred in Florida in 1977 as the plaintiff
claimed, then the borrowing statute was inapplicable and the suit was timely.
In short, the two states defined the concept of "injury" in different ways.
Applying the so-called "significant relationship criteria," the court
found that New York clearly had "the significant relationship with Mee-
han. , 3
05
Meehan was a resident of New York at the time of his exposure;
the employer was domiciled in New York; the entire asbestos ex-
posure was at one place of employment in New York; and Meehan
continued to reside in New York for twenty-five years after his ex-
posure to asbestos. These circumstances establish that the place
where the conduct causing the injury occurred, Meehan's domicile,
and the domicile of Meehan's employer at the time of the conduct
causing the injury were all in the state of New York. The only sig-
nificant contact with Florida is that the injury manifested itself and
was discovered in this state. We find these circumstances establish
a significant relationship with New York and, consequently, under
the law of New York at the time of the district court of appeal deci-
sion, section 95.10 barred the action in Florida.
306
This was not the end, however. While Meehan was pending, the New York
Legislature enacted a statute that revived any time-barred claim for personal
injury caused by the latent effects of exposure to asbestos, whether previ-
ously dismissed or otherwise, provided the action was brought within the
one-year period from July 1986 to July 1987.307 The majority briefly
discussed the effect of this statute and concluded that Meehan's claim had
been revived and could proceed in Florida, conditioned on the application of
New York substantive law to other issues in the case.
308
The court was straightforward enough in its adoption of a contact-
counting method and in its identification of the contacts that were relevant
303. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 145.
304. Id.
305. Id. at 146
306. Id. (citations omitted).
307. Id.
308. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 146.
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for this purpose-the four contacts of section 145(2).309 But the first
problem with the majority's approach was that the addition was wrong. The
court never dealt with the place where injury occurred because it never
decided whether it was exposure or discovery that constituted Meehan's
"injury." The fact that New York and Florida defined injury differently lay
at the heart of the dispute, intertwined with the place of injury and with the
ultimate issue, the question of which state, by virtue of "significant relation-
ships," should determine where a cause of action based on the injury
arose.310 The court simply fudged the question, saying that "Meehan was a
resident of New York at the time of his exposure," and that "injury mani-
fested itself and was discovered in... [Florida]. 311 Presumably, the place-
of-injury contact belonged to neither state.
As to the second contact, the court assumed without analysis or discus-
sion that the place of injury-causing conduct was New York, apparently
because Meehan was exposed to asbestos dust there.312 The wrongful
conduct complained of, however, was not the fact of exposure. It was the
manufacture and sale of products in an unreasonably dangerous condition
with no warning of that fact.313 Carmella Meehan chose to sue the manu-
facturers of these products in strict liability-Celotex in particular as the
successor in interest to Philip Carey, an Ohio corporation whose asbestos
products had been manufactured in Ohio, and from there sold and shipped to
various states, among them New York. It is hard to see how this "significant
relationship" could fall to New York.
The court's treatment of the third contact was equally superficial. So
far as the facts in the opinion disclosed, none of the defendants were New
York corporations or had principal places of business there. 14  Their
products, manufactured elsewhere, found their way into New York and were
used there, as in many other states. Celotex itself was a Delaware corpora-
tion, present and doing business in any number of states, including Florida.
Since the Brooklyn Navy Yard, Meehan's former employer, was not a party
to the action, it is hard to see how its domicile was significant. The court
asserted that decisively significant relationships with New York existed
309. Id.
310. Id. at 145-46.
311. Id. at 146.
312. Id.
313. See Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
314. Id.
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because Meehan was a resident of New York, was exposed to asbestos there,
and continued to make New York his home for some time thereafter.315 It
failed to mention in this part of its analysis that he was, and had been for
eight years, a resident of Florida when his illness was discovered, continued
to make his home in Florida thereafter until his death, and was survived by
his wife, plaintiff in the action, who was also a Florida resident. If New
York domicile at the time of exposure was a significant relationship with
New York, then surely Florida domicile at the time of discovery was an
equally significant relationship with Florida.
The particular facts of the case gave little scope to the place where the
relationship between the parties, if any, was centered. An Ohio corporation
manufactured the injury-causing product in Ohio. By chance, Meehan was
exposed to that product in New York, where he lived and worked at the time;
by chance, he was living in Florida when it first became apparent that he had
suffered injuries from this exposure. Meehan's widow brought suit in
Florida against the defendant, Celotex, a Delaware corporation who had
stepped into the shoes of the original manufacturer through a series of
corporate acquisitions, and who was present and doing business in Florida.
Whatever the "center" of a relationship between parties is, and the court's
opinion contained no discussion of this abstraction, no obvious one existed
here.31
6
The facts thus provided little basis for the court's conclusion that the
significant relationships added up to New York rather than Florida. The
contacts were either split between the two states, belonged to neither, or
were too diffuse to be of help. The chief flaw in the majority's arithmetic
was in attempting to decide where Meehan's cause of action for injury arose
without first deciding what constituted his injury. In fact, the case presented
the rather rare situation in which the place of injury was not a given, but
itself was the underlying issue in dispute.
The second problem with the court's approach was that it effectively
read section 6 and its interest analysis provisions out of the Restatement.
The Restatement never suggests counting the four contacts of section 145(2);
it directs a court to take them into account in applying the principles of
315. Id. at 146.
316. In her dissenting opinion, Justice Barkett argued that "the plaintiff had been a Flor-
ida resident for eight years before the disease manifested. All of the witnesses and testimony
on damages will be in Florida. Thus, on the damages issues, the relationship between the
parties clearly is centered in Florida." Id. at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting
in part).
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section 6. The court's utter failure to do this left it blind to the fact that it
was dealing with a false conflict, one in which Florida was the only state
interested in the application of its law. This point was sharply focused by
Justice Barkett in her dissent:
Several of... [the section 6] criteria are applicable here. For
example, Florida clearly has an interest in protecting its residents
from the hazards of occupational disease and allowing resident
victims a right of action in such cases, based not upon the time of
exposure but upon the victim's reasonable discovery of the disease.
In light of New York's recent legislation, New York has the identi-
cal interest and policy. In fact, the recent legislation indicates that
New York now favors the plaintiffs right to sue in such actions
over the defendant's right not to be subjected to such suits even
where the incubation period of the disease is great. Thus, there is
no countervailing policy consideration to... [Florida's] interest in
allowing this action to proceed.317
Justice Barkett also pointed out that there would be no conflict of policies
even without New York's one-year revival statute.318 No defendant was
sufficiently connected with New York, either at the time of exposure or the
time of suit, to claim the protection of its exposure rule. In light of this,
Justice Barkett stated, "it is difficult to see what interest New York has in the
action at all. 319
New York's exposure rule reflects a policy of "outlawing stale
claims" 32° in order to grant repose "to every person and industry who could
be a potential defendant., 321 But the intended beneficiaries of this policy, as
Currie might have said, are those defendants with whose welfare New York
is legitimately concerned-namely, those who are residents or domiciliaries
of New York, or possibly, with corporations, those having their principal
places of business there. Since none of the corporate defendants had such a
relationship with New York, application of its law would not have furthered
that policy. Conversely, because Carmella Meehan was a Florida resident,
as was her husband during the last nine years of his life, the compensatory
policy reflected in Florida's rule delaying accrual of a cause of action until
317. Id.
318. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151.
319. Id.
320. Schmidt v. Merchants Despatch Transp. Co., 200 N.E. 824, 827-28 (N.Y. 1936).
321. Schwartz v. Heyden Newport Chemical Corp., 188 N.E.2d 142, 145 (N.Y. 1963).
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discovery 322 would have been furthered by its application. Florida was the
only interested state, and its law should have been applied.
The court's opinion in Meehan shows that despite its seeming arith-
metical simplicity and certainty, contact-counting as a method can be highly
subjective and unpredictable. Even an accurate and exacting count would
have left the contacts split at best, with no obvious "center of gravity. 323
And if the contacts are fairly evenly divided, what can arithmetic tell a court
then? One danger at this point is that a court may yield to the temptation to
ascribe more "weight" to some contacts than others, to multiply them, or
invent new and possibly irrelevant ones in order to make the count seem
more decisive, much as the court did, for example, with the domicile of
Meehan's employer.324  That contact had no actual relevance since the
employer was not a party; it was, in any case, only another way of saying
that Meehan lived and worked in New York at the time of exposure.
More critically, the method adopted in Meehan is at complete variance
with the plain text of the Restatement. Section 6 was never mentioned
except as part of the quotation of section 145(2), and most certainly its
principles were never applied. In reading section 6 and its interest analysis
provisions out of the Restatement, the court left itself with no way of
distinguishing the easy cases of false conflict from the harder ones in which
the clash of underlying policies is real. It is a little stunning to realize that
after Meehan, a paradigm false conflict like Bishop could conceivably be
resolved by the application of South Carolina law since two of the four
contacts, the place of injury and the place of injury-causing conduct, would
fall immediately to South Carolina.3 5 Presumably the Restatement was
adopted in the first place to avoid this sort of result. Almost all of the
modem approaches, the Restatement prominently among them, make use of
interest analysis to identify false conflicts, and almost all resolve such cases
in the same way, by applying the law of the only interested state.326 Flexible
and eclectic though the Restatement approach may be, it simply cannot be
used to support the result reached in Meehan.2 7
322. See Seaboard Air Line R.R. Co. v. C.D. Ford, 92 So. 2d 160, 164 (Fla. 1956).
323. See supra note 211.
324. See Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 146.
325. Compare the comment of Chief Judge Schwartz in Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi,
435 So. 2d 290, 299 n.8 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1983) (Schwartz, J., dissenting), that "Bishop
did not hold that the lex loci might not be applied, upon proper analysis, in the case itself."
326. See sources cited supra note 204.
327. In fairness, this assertion requires qualification. Florida is not alone in indulging in
what I consider to be a misuse of the Restatement's methodology. Many commentators have
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These three cases, then, represent the sum total of the court's decision
making with the Second Restatement to date. Even though the approach
taken in Meehan differs radically from that of Olsen and Piccolo, the three
cases nevertheless have important elements in common. Most striking,
perhaps, is the fact that all end with the application of the law of some state
other than Florida. There is no reason to believe that the Supreme Court of
Florida is indifferent to the policies embodied in Florida's laws or thinks
them unimportant. Yet it is clear that when these policies come into conflict
with those of another state, it is Florida's that will yield. This pattern is
evident in the whole of the court's conflicts jurisprudence, which literally
bristles with references to comity, the principle by which the courts of one
state give effect to the laws of another out of deference and respect.32 The
court has rested much of its conflicts doctrine on comity and evidently takes
seriously its role in "the fostering of amiable and respectful relations among
individual states. 329
A second striking feature in these cases, closely related to the first, is
the court's marked unwillingness to employ the techniques of interest
analysis. Section 6 and its interest analysis provisions are a major compo-
nent of the Restatement approach. Yet in none of these cases did the court
give serious consideration to the content of Florida's laws and the impor-
tance of the policies they reflect, much less the extent to which Florida might
be interested in the application of its laws to further those policies. In like
fashion, the court paid little attention to the relevant policies reflected in the
competing laws of the other states involved or the degree to which they were
interested in their application. Even had it wanted to, the court was obvi-
ously in no position to make the comparative judgment that the Restatement
calls for, the determination of which state's interests are "most deeply
affected."
Also apparent in these cases is the court's preference for a simple and
easy approach, one likely to produce certain, predictable, and uniform results
without much fuss or bother. This tendency can be seen in the cases that
identified the parallel between the "most significant relationship" concept and the contact-
counting approach pioneered by the New York Court of Appeals in Auten v. Auten, 124
N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1954). See, e.g., Kay, supra note 119, at 527-28. The courts of several
states appear to treat the two as virtually the same. See id. at 557 & n.229, (citing as examples
Schwartz v. Schwartz, 447 P.2d 254, 256-57 (Ariz. 1968); Fuerste v. Bemis, 156 N.W.2d
831, 833 (Iowa 1968); Pioneer Credit Corp. v. Carden, 245 A.2d 891, 893-94 (Vt. 1968);
Baffin Land Corp. v. Monticello Motor Inn, Inc., 425 P.2d 623, 625 n.1 (Wash. 1967)).
328. See cases cited supra note 8.
329. Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3, 7 (Fla. 1974).
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antedate the Restatement, and it is especially pronounced in Olsen and
Piccolo. Even Meehan, unwise and misguided though I think it is, can be
read as an attempt to simplify and streamline the Restatement's complex
approach. Given the mess that some courts have made of conflicts cases, it
is hard to fault this attitude, but neither should its implications be missed.
The cases show that the court's primary emphasis in conflicts cases is on the
choice-of-law decision itself, not the result it produces. In a purely domestic
case, the court is as diligent as any in its search for substantive justice-in
reaching a result, that is, that seems fair and just and that makes good socio-
economic sense for the case as a whole. In a conflicts case, on the other
hand, what the court seems to value most is a quick and uncomplicated way
of choosing the governing law, leaving the chips to fall thereafter where they
may.
This sort of decision making is not to everyone's taste. It is unspec-
tacular and passive, perhaps excessively deferential to the interests of other
states, and usually results in the suppression of the policies embodied in
Florida's laws, and along with them, frequently, the fortunes of Florida
residents claiming their protection. In all three cases the policies implicated
in Florida's laws were ones that could have been fairly characterized under
traditional theory as "strongly held," and in all three Florida was interested
in the application of its laws to vindicate those policies. With a case like
Gillen on the books and the open-ended, policy-oriented provisions of the
Restatement at its disposal, it is a little hard to understand why none of this
seemed to count with the court.
After Olsen and Piccolo, it was at least possible to ascribe to the court a
principled basis for its decision making, the use of the place of injury as an
arbitrary solution for cases of true conflict, primarily for reasons of simplic-
ity, certainty, and convenience, it is true, but principled nonetheless.
Meehan changed all that. There is no warrant in the Restatement for simply
counting the contacts of section 145(2) and in the process reading the
principles of section 6, the Restatement's most important single section, out
of it altogether. In taking this approach in Meehan, the court cut itself off
from interest analysis and now has no way of distinguishing easy cases like
Bishop, in which the choice-of-law is clear, from hard ones like Olsen, in
which it is more difficult. Certainty, predictability, and ease of decision
making were lost as well. Contact counting can be messy, indecisive,
uncertain, and subjective. Meehan proves that, if nothing else.
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V. CONCLUSION
A great deal of experimentation in choice-of-law methodology has gone
on around the country in this century, particularly in the last forty years.
From near unanimity at the turn of the century, the states have arrived today,
with the choice-of-law revolution, at a point of astonishing diversity. Some
continue to use traditional territorial methods in all areas; others have
adopted one of the modem approaches; others, like Florida, use a combina-
tion of the two; and still others use a blend or synthesis of modem ap-
proaches in what has aptly been called "judicial eclecticism. '330 Across the
states, the elusive goal of uniformity of result has become unattainable as a
practical matter. Without knowing in what state a lawsuit will be brought, it
is impossible to predict whose law will govern. For those who can afford it,
forum shopping has become the order of the day.
The source of all the diversity, some might say confusion, is not hard to
identify. With the steady erosion of territorial constraints, it has become
increasingly evident that there is no widely shared agreement on what it is
that a choice-of-law method is supposed to accomplish. 331 Everyone has an
opinion, but there is still no consensus on the basic underlying question
whether it is the method that should count or the results that it produces.
About the most that any one court can do is to adopt an approach with which
it is temperamentally comfortable and then adhere to it consistently. At least
in that way there can be a measure of uniformity, predictability, and cer-
tainty within a single jurisdiction.
Today there are almost as many choice-of-law theories as there are
scholars and commentators. Of the modern approaches, at least nine have
found sufficient favor to be adopted as rules of decision by one or more of
330. See LEFLAR ET AL., supra note 60, at 281-82. The authors say that "j]udicial deci-
sions in choice-of-law cases in the 1980's are not as diverse as the variety of [modem]
theories and approaches ... might suggest. The majority of American courts are synthesizing
most of the theories, bringing them by loose interpretation closer together... The effect is
that all the modem theories are being bundled together by the courts, to make up 'the new
law' of choice of law." At a later point, the authors assert that "most of the modem decisions,
regardless of exact language, are substantially consistent with each other. [Whatever] ... the
opinion language... the real reasons and the results are likely to be about the same." Id. at
304. This "coming together" assessment of current developments is not a universally
applauded one. See, e.g., Reppy, supra note 204. For an invaluable survey of the approaches
in use in courts around the country through 1989, see Kay, supra note 119.
331. See, e.g., CRAMTON ETAL., supra note 28, at 230-37.
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the states.332 The Second Restatement is the most popular of these, but it has
also been the most criticized.333 In my view, it has suffered unfairly at the
hands of its critics. It can hardly be faulted for reflecting the confusion and
uncertainty of the choice-of-law revolution in its combination of open-ended,
policy-oriented provisions and presumptive, jurisdiction-selecting rules. The
thrust of the criticism seems to be that it is too "flabby and amorphous" to be
of real help in the choice-of-law process. 334 Yet the blueprint provided by
the text and the accompanying comments is a good deal more precise than
this criticism would suggest.
The comments to section 188(2) direct a court to relate the enumerated
contacts to the interest analysis provisions of section 6.335 The purpose of
this is to determine whether a state having one or more of these contacts with
the parties or the transaction is interested in the application of its law.336
"Interest" in this sense means that the relevant policy of the law would be
furthered were it applied. If so, this constitutes a "weighty reason" for
applying it.337 It seems self-evident that this process also supplies content to
the term "significant relationship," which is not otherwise defined. Any
state interested in the application of its law will have such a relationship. If
there is only one such state, then it is the state of "most significant relation-
ship."
To this point, the Restatement's method is clear. If there is fault, it is
that at this point the Restatement fails to provide exact guidance for the
resolution of cases in which both states are interested in the application of
their laws-for true conflicts, in other words. Yet this is the Gordian knot
that no court or commentator has thus far been able to cut in a satisfying or
convincing way. It seems idle to criticize the Restatement for leaving a court
to its own devices at this juncture. Everybody knows the game cannot end in
a tie. To avoid the appearance of bias, or perhaps for reasons of ease,
certainty, and predictability, some courts will want an arbitrary way of
denominating the state of "most significant relationship"; others will prefer
332. See Kay, supra note 119, at 585. Professor Kay states that along with the
"traditional vested rights" approach, "American courts follow, either singly or in combination,
a 'center of gravity,' 'governmental interest,' 'comparative impairment,' 'most significant
relationship,' 'better law,' 'principles of preference,' 'functional,' [or] 'lex fori' . . . approach
to choice of law questions." Id.
333. See, e.g., CRAMTON Er AL., supra note 28, at 132-33.
334. See CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 3, at 300.
335. RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(2) cmt. e.
336. See id. § 188(1) cmt. b.
337. Id. § 6(2) cmt. e.
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to debate degrees of significance as a way of rationalizing the conclusion
that one state's relationship is more significant than another's. The Re-
statement seems to invite a relative judgment with its "most deeply affected"
language,338 but it can support either approach.
In the final analysis, how these difficult cases ought to be resolved has
to remain for each court a matter of individual attitude and outlook rather
than methodology. Use of the Restatement approach in the manner de-
scribed quickly and easily enables the untroubling cases of false conflict to
be recognized and disposed of, leaving a court free to spend its time and
energies in deciding how it wants to resolve the harder cases of true conflict
with the other values of section 6 as a guide. Taken on its own terms, the
Restatement provides as sound an approach as any to choice-of-law. The
problems that have arisen in actual use are not so much with the Restatement
as with the courts themselves.
Florida is a case in point. The supreme court adopted the Restatement
approach for torts cases in 1980 and has used it in three cases since. 339 In the
first, the analysis was painfully superficial, in the second, nonexistent.
Though each was a true conflict, lex loci delicti better explains the results
than anything contained in the Restatement. In the third case, Meehan, the
court transmuted the "most significant relationship" approach into one of
counting "significant relationship criteria."34° In the process it read section 6
and its interest analysis provisions out of the Restatement and managed to
end with New York law, even though the conflict was false and Florida was
the only interested state.341 This is Second Restatement decision-making in
name only.
One can only wonder why the court adopted the Restatement in the first
place. The court has barely mentioned section 6, the Restatement's single
most important section, and in particular has made no use of its interest
analysis provisions. This is hard to understand. Interest analysis represents
the most profound advance in choice-of-law thinking in this century and is
an integral part of most modem approaches. 342 It is not a novel idea, nor an
338. See id. cmt. f.
339. Celotex Corp. v. Meehan, 523 So. 2d 141 (Fla. 1988); Hertz Corp. v. Piccolo, 453
So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1984); State Farms Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Olsen, 406 So. 2d 1109 (Fla. 1981).
340. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 144-45.
341. Id.
342. See sources cited supra note 204.
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overly complex one.343 Certainly lack of awareness cannot explain it; Justice
Barkett employed the technique with telling effect in her dissent in Mee-
han344 -an opinion, incidentally, which can stand as a textbook example of
how the Restatement ought to be used.
It was presumably to avoid the sterile and indefensible results that lex
loci delicti was wont to produce in false conflicts like Bishop v. Florida
Specialty Paint Co.345 that prompted the court to make the change originally.
One of the Restatement's great strengths is the emphasis it places on the
relevant policies of the states whose laws conflict. The Restatement allows a
court to distinguish false conflicts like Bishop and Meehan from true
conflicts like Olsen and Piccolo, and it opens the road to serious thought
about how the more difficult cases should be resolved. That strength was
dissipated in Meehan, along with the simplicity, certainty, and predictability
that the court has always seemed to favor in a choice-of-law method.
Meehan's effect was to confuse choice-of-law, not to simplify it or make it
more rational. It seems clear that the court has yet to reach the stage of
considering what approach to take to true conflict resolution, and it has now
left itself with no way of recognizing one when it arises.
At the supreme court level, the adoption of the Restatement for torts
346
cases has gained little while costing much, and that is reason enough in
itself to oppose its extension to the area of contracts. It is obvious that the
court is free to use the Restatement in any way it wishes. It is also obvious
that what today's court or tomorrow's might do is at best a matter of con-
jecture. Still, it seems all too likely that the court would soon call the five
contacts of section 188(2) the "significant relationship criteria" and use the
sum of these as its basis for choice. Contact counting is not the approach of
the Second Restatement: it ignores the relevant policies of the states whose
343. The enormous literature that has grown up around Currie's work, much of it critical,
might suggest otherwise. See, e.g., CRAMTON ET AL., supra note 28, at 152 (listing some of the
more important critiques and responses thereto). See generally id. at 152-206.
344. Meehan, 523 So. 2d at 151 (Barkett, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
345. 389 So. 2d 999 (Fla. 1980). See Lescard v. Keel, 211 So. 2d 868 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct.
App. 1968); Messinger v. Tom, 203 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 2d Dist. Ct. App. 1967).
346. The same cannot be said of the district courts of appeal. At this level, the effect of
adopting the Second Restatement has been profound and decidedly salutary. Most of the
cases decided by the district courts with the approach of the Second Restatement thus far have
been false conflicts. These have been sensibly resolved under the new freedom conferred by
Bishop in favor of the law of the only interested state, although with a somewhat uneven
appreciation for the method of the Restatement generally and interest analysis in particular.
See Southerland, supra note 5, at 803 nn.121 & 123; Finch, supra note 30, at 683-84.
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laws conflict and their interests in furthering those policies.347 As a method,
it is subjective. Contact counting allows a court to rationalize an intuitive
sense of whose law should govern without the need to articulate, even to
itself, the nature or source of the intuition. It is subjective also in that
someone must decide what contacts are to be counted and whether some are
weightier than others; it can tempt a court to the manipulation, multiplica-
tion, and invention of contacts. And finally, it is inexact and uncertain, with
no clear answer for cases where the contacts are closely divided or the count
is indecisive.34
From its general pattern of decision-making in conflicts cases, it also
seems clear that the court feels no real need for a method as complex as the
Restatement's. Bishop itself was something of a fluke; the opinion began
life as a lone dissent by Justice England, and the court's use of the Restate-
ment has been grudging since, as if it were still of two minds in the matter.
The court has seldom shown any inclination to control the outcome of a case
by manipulating the choice-of-law decision; it has never seemed concerned
with results in this sense, only with a quick and easy way of making the
determination, preferably one reflecting an over elaborate concern for the
laws and policies of other states.349 The bias for forum law so often detect-
347. See WEINTRAUB, supra note 52, at 378-382.
348. See, e.g., CURRIE, supra note 98, at 726-39.
349. This is particularly true in the area of torts. In its application of the law of some
state other than Florida, the court's record.is almost unblemished. See Southerland, supra
note 5, at 863 n.355 and accompanying text.
In contracts cases, on the other hand, the overall impression is rather one of randomness.
There is no clear pattern in the decisions apart from the fact that they are rather faithfully rule
oriented; the "chips fall where they may" cliche best describes the tone of the opinions and the
results reached. In chronological order, the cases are: Perry v. Lewis, 6 Fla. 555 (1856)
(forum law) (Florida law applied to permit Alabama plaintiff to recover from Florida
defendant); Walters & Walker v. Whitlock, 9 Fla. 86 (1860) (place of making) (no conflict
between South Carolina and Florida law); Walling v. Christian & Craft Grocery Co., 27 So.
46 (Fla. 1899) (place of making) (Florida married woman cannot invoke emancipated status
under Alabama law to validate contract made in Florida); Brown v. Case, 86 So. 684 (Fla.
1920) (forum law) (Florida five-year statute of limitations bars action to recover on promis-
sory notes made and enforceable in New York from defendant who thereafter relocated to
Florida and resided there for six years prior to institution of suit); Lloyd v. Cooper Corp., 134
So. 562 (Fla. 1931) (public policy) (married woman's contract made in Ohio and valid there
not enforceable in Florida); Kellogg-Citizens Nat'l Bank v. Felton, 199 So. 50 (Fla. 1940)
(public policy) (refusing enforcement of Florida married woman's contract valid in Wisconsin
where made and plaintiff resided, but invalid in Florida where she subsequently became
domiciled); Scott v. Scott, 61 So. 2d 324 (Fla. 1952) (place of making) (enforcement in
Florida of separation agreement valid in Pennsylvania, where not contrary to Florida public
policy); Sherbill v. Miller Mfg. Co., 89 So. 2d 28 (Fla. 1956) (public policy) (clause in
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able in the choice-of-law decisions of courts elsewhere 350 has been notably
lacking in Florida. Relevant policies and state interests are clearly not a
contract waiving execution on homestead property valid in Virginia where made denied
enforcement in Florida on public policy grounds); Ray-HofAgencies, Inc. v. Petersen, 123 So.
2d 251 (Fla. 1960) (place of making) (finding that place of making of employment contract
was Georgia and not Florida, and denying workmen's compensation benefits to Florida
resident injured outside of Florida); Cerniglia v. C. & D. Farms, Inc., 203 So. 2d 1 (Fla.
1967) (per curiam) (public policy) (noncompetition agreement valid where made denied
enforcement in Florida on public policy grounds); Colhoun v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 265 So.
2d 18 (Fla. 1972) (place of making) (contract of carriage for interstate transportation made in
Florida, where ticket was purchased so that Florida contract statute of limitations applied in
damages suit for breach of contract); Wingold v. Horowitz, 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974) (forum
law) (applying Florida remedial law favoring Canadian resident suing Florida resident for
breach of contract made in the Bahamas and expressly subject to Bahamian law); Gillen v.
United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974) (public policy) (denying effect to "other
insurance" clause in policy issued in New Hampshire as contrary to Florida public policy);
Goodman v. Olsen, 305 So. 2d 753 (Fla. 1975) (place of making) (usurious nature of lending
agreement made in New York governed by New York and not Florida law in suit by New
York lender against Florida borrower); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Grounds, 332 So.
2d 13 (Fla. 1976) (place of performance) (clause prohibiting excess judgment recovery valid
in Mississippi where contract was made held invalid in Florida where insured was sued and
insurer was obligated to provide good-faith defense); Continental Mortgage Investors v.
Sailboat Key, Inc., 395 So. 2d 507 (Fla. 1981) (party autonomy) (upholding choice-of-law
clause in interstate loan contract made in Massachusetts, even though interest rate was
usurious under Florida law); Morgan Walton Properties, Inc. v. International City Bank &
Trust Co., 404 So. 2d 1059 (Fla. 1981) (party autonomy) (upholding choice-of-law clause in
mortgage agreement valid in Louisiana where made, but usurious under Florida law);
Burroughs Corp. v. Suntogs of Miami, Inc., 472 So. 2d 1166 (Fla. 1985) (party autonomy)
(contractual provision fixing shorter limitation period, valid in Michigan where contract
entered into but void under Florida law, enforced in Florida lawsuit as not contrary to Florida
public policy); Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988) (place of making) (applying
New York law where insurance contract was entered into to prohibit interspousal suit in
Florida to recover for negligently inflicted personal injury); and Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co. v.
August, 530 So. 2d 293 (Fla. 1988) (place of making) (applying Massachusetts statute of
limitations in Florida lawsuit against insurer for uninsured motorist benefits arising out of
accident in Florida).
350. See, e.g., LEFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 263. A good example of apparent bias in
favor of forum law can be found in the New York Court of Appeals' well-known line of guest
statute decisions in the 1960s. The majority notes in Tooker v. Lopez, 249 N.E.2d 394 (N.Y.
1969), that Judge Breitel, in his dissenting opinion, went so far as to suggest that the court's
choice-of-law method amounted to nothing more than "a rule which will always result in the
application of New York law." Id. at 401. Criticizing the majority's indifference to the
significance of the place of injury, he said: "What has happened of course, is that lip service
is paid to the factor of place, and promptly ignored thereafter, if the forum prefers its own
policy preconceptions and especially if it requires denial of recovery to a plaintiff in a tort
case." Id. at 411 (Breitel, J., dissenting).
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concern. For a court with these predilections, an approach as sophisticated
as the Second Restatement's is largely redundant.
Extending it to contracts cases, moreover, has the potential for causing
a great deal of unnecessary confusion and uncertainty at the level of the
district courts of appeal, where most of the decision-making in conflicts
cases goes on. Since 1980, the supreme court's sporadic and doctrinally
inconsistent opinions have given these important appellate courts little in the
way of guidance, and they have been left to find their way through the
Restatement's labyrinth pretty much on their own. In contrast to the su-
preme court, the district courts have tended to approach conflicts cases as if
they mattered, but the opinions reflect some striking variations in methodol-
ogy with nothing like consensus emerging from the considerable number of
cases decided at this level.351 To the extent that there is a predominant
approach, it is, unfortunately, that of counting contacts or "significant
relationships"35 2 -a method, as I have said, that finds little support in the
Restatement and that is fraught with uncertainty, unpredictability, and
subjectivity.
Decisions in this vein, in fact, are probably responsible for the approach
taken by the supreme court in Meehan; and with that case now it place, it is
almost certain that contracts cases would be dealt with in the same way,
certainly by panels already inclined in that direction. In relatively few
instances has there been much attempt to relate contacts to the policies
underlying laws in conflict and thus little in the way of identification or
discussion of the interests of concerned states in the application of their
laws.53 In the district courts, as in the supreme court, reluctance to employ
the interest analysis provisiolis of section 6 is the most striking methodologi-
cal feature of decision making with the Second Restatement.
35 4
The opinions of Chief Judge Schwartz of the third district are notable
exceptions to this generalization,355 however, and Judge Baskin continues to
utilize interest analysis in her opinions though expressly disclaiming its
351. See Finch, supra note 30, at 680-81; Southerland, supra note 5, at 827-28.
352. See Finch, supra note 30, at 687-90; Southerland, supra note 5, at 827-29, 839-42.
353. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 839 & n.261; Finch, supra note 30, at 690-703.
354. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 839 & n.261.
355. See Adams v. Brannan, 500 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986); Young v.
Hertz Corp., 496 So. 2d 175 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App. 1986) (Schwartz, C.J., concurring
specially); Proprietors Ins. Co. v. Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d 290, 298 (Fla. 3d Dist. Ct. App.
1983) (Schwartz, C.J., dissenting opinion).
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appropriateness to a Second Restatement analysis. 356 As a court, the fifth
District has made the most determined use of policy-oriented methodology
in its decision making. 357 In Stallworth v. Hospitality Rentals, Inc., 35 8 the
first district rested the result there on a section 6 policy analysis that resem-
bled a weighing of interests more than anything else.359 What this suggests,
unfortunately, is that there are significant differences of opinion among the
judges of the district courts as to how the Restatement ought to be used.
These differences would undoubtedly carry over into the area of contracts
with the result that decision making in that area would be far less certain and
predictable than it is at present.
The confusion and uncertainty that have surrounded the use of the
Second Restatement at all levels in Florida make for the strongest argument
against extending its approach to the area of contracts. The Second Re-
statement was designed to accommodate a variety of outlooks on choice-of-
law, but not all in one place and at the same time. The district courts would
probably welcome the Restatement's greater flexibility and sensitivity and
on the whole would probably make imaginative use of its protean possibili-
ties. But without strong leadership from the supreme court-something that
so far has been significantly lacking-its virtues could all too easily become
liabilities in an area like contracts, where the need for certainty and predict-
ability is so great.
Lex loci contractus, as Justice Kogan observed in Sturiano, is old but
not yet outdated.3 ° It has been the rule in Florida for almost a hundred years
and has fit well on the whole with the temperament and interest of Florida's
courts. If nothing else, it has familiarity to commend it, ingrained not only
in judicial thinking and that of the practicing bar, but, as much as any rule,
understood and relied upon by those who enter into contracts. It hardly
needs to be said that the area of contract is quintessentially one in which it is
more important to have a certain and predictable approach rather than one
356. See Valsecchi, 435 So. 2d at 297; Harris v. Berkowitz, 432 So. 2d 613, 616 (Fla. 3d
Dist. Ct. App. 1983).
357. See Brown & Root, Inc. v. Ring Power Corp., 450 So. 2d 1245 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct.
App. 1984); Andrews v. Continental Ins. Co., 444 So. 2d 479 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1984);
Arnica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Gifford, 434 So. 2d 1015 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1983); cf. Olsen v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 386 So. 2d 600 (Fla. 5th Dist. Ct. App. 1980) (pre-
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) opinion refusing to apply Louisiana law permitting thief to convey
good title to innocent purchaser as contrary to Florida's public policy).
358. 515 So. 2d 413 (Fla. 1st Dist. Ct. App. 1987).
359. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 844-47.
360. See Sturiano, 523 So. 2d at 1129.
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that can be manipulated on an ad hoc basis to produce the result that strikes a
particular court on a particular day as most "just."
Yet in marked contrast to its torts counterpart with its relentless
mandate for the law of the place of injury, lex loci contractus has survived
and continues to enjoy a significant measure of popularity today precisely
because it has never been a rule just for the sake of having a rule; it actually
bears a certain correspondence to the world of people and affairs of which it
is a part. There is widely shared agreement as to what constitutes a "just"
result in a contracts case. It is one that effectuates the intentions of the
parties and protects their expectations. People ordinarily intend to make
valid agreements, and it is still apt to be more true than not that they tend to
gauge such matters by the law of the place where they act.3 61 To find on a
later day some court upholding and enforcing an agreement that was valid
where it was made may be disappointing, yet not out of line with the parties'
original expectations. There is probably no such thing as a "good" or "bad"
accident, but American society freely tolerates, even applauds, the idea of
bad bargains. Without losers, after all, there can be no winners.
Moreover-and again in sharp contrast to the place-of-injury rule-
there has always been some play in the joints of lex loci contractus. In
Government Employees Insurance Co. v. Grounds,362 for example, the court
invoked the performance branch of the rule to uphold an excess judgment
award against an insurance company which had breached its obligation to
provide its insured a good faith defense. The company's insured caused an
accident in Florida and was sued there. Though liability was clear, the
company refused to accept an offer to settle for the policy limits, and the
case went to trial. The resulting judgment far exceeded the policy limits,
and the insured sued his company to recover the excess. Florida law
permitted such an action; the law of Mississippi, where the contract of
insurance was made and entered into, did not.363 The court applied Florida
law, holding that "the place of performance was Florida, where the cause of
action against... [the insured] was maintained and was defended by... [the
company] .,,364 Wingold v. Horowit 365 involved a real estate financing deal
that was concluded in the Bahamas between a Florida resident and a resident
of Canada, the contract being made in the Bahamas and expressly subject to
361. See, e.g., Laycock, supra note 29, at 318-20.
362. 332 So. 2d 13 (Fla. 1976).
363. Id. at 14.
364. Id. at 15.
365. 292 So. 2d 585 (Fla. 1974).
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Bahamian law.366 When the Florida resident defaulted on his obligations and
was sued in Florida, the supreme court invoked the forum law branch of the
rule to give the Canadian partner the benefit of Florida's more favorable
remedial law.
367
Decisions like these have tended to be the exception rather than the rule
in Florida, but they suggest that Justice Kogan may have overstressed the
inflexibility of lex loci contractus a bit in his Sturiano opinion. There will
no doubt be cases where the place of making is fortuitous and has little to do
either with the parties or their transaction, 368 but it is unlikely that this will
also be true of the place of performance. Lex loci contractus offers enough
choices to be useful, but not so many as to become unpredictable. And for
the relatively rare case where the otherwise applicable law would produce an
intolerable result, there is always the public policy exception to fall back
on.3 69 The main flaw in using territorial connecting factors as a basis for
choosing law is that this approach either ignores or at least tends to obscure
the policies underlying laws in conflict and the interests of the concerned
states in their application. But in its studied refusal to utilize the techniques
of interest analysis, the Supreme Court of Florida, as well as most of the
district courts of appeal, seems committed to this course already. As long as
state interests are going to be ignored, they might as well be ignored in as
simple and uncomplicated a way as possible.370
366. Id. at 585-86.
367. Id. at 586.
368. In contrast to the First Restatement, the Second Restatement takes the position that
the place of contracting, standing alone,
is a relatively insignificant contact.... [I]ssues involving the validity of a con-
tract will, in perhaps the majority of situations, be determined in accordance with
the local law of the state of contracting. In such situations, however, this state
will be the state of the applicable law for reasons additional to the fact that it
happens to be the place where occurred the last act necessary to give the contract
binding effect.... By way of contrast, the place of contracting will have little
significance, if any, when it is purely fortuitous and bears no relation to the par-
ties and the contract .....
RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 188(2) cmt. e.
369. See, e.g., Gillen v. United Services Auto. Ass'n, 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
370. Compare the remarks of the West Virginia Supreme Court in Paul v. National Life,
352 S.E.2d 550 (W. Va. 1986), a guest-statute case in which the court refused to abandon its
long-standing adherence to the lex loci delicti rule. The court said: "Nevertheless, we remain
convinced that the traditional rule, for all of its faults, remains superior to any of its modem
competitors. Moreover, if we are going to manipulate conflicts doctrine in order to achieve
substantive results, we might as well manipulate something we understand." Id. at 556. The
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Despite its richness, the scholarship of the choice-of-law revolution has
not succeeded in reconciling the conflicting demands of "justice" in cases
with multistate implications.371 Considerations of substantive justice-in a
nutshell, the impulse to decide cases in ways that make good socio-economic
sense 372-continue to compete with the array of values associated with the
need for rules and the attendant pressure to follow them.373 It is no denigra-
tion of contemporary scholarship to say that much of it seems to skirt the
role that value judgments play in the process,374 perhaps in tacit recognition
of the fact that the whole subject represents a wildly unpredictable variable
that no theory can control for.
Yet long ago Holmes identified value judgments as the "very root and
nerve of the whole proceeding, ' 375 cautioning that courts decide cases not so
much by rules as by value judgments.37 6 These, like beauty, exist only in the
eye of the beholder; they are statements not of what is but of what ought to
be, and so are necessarily as subjective as the individual who holds them.
Whether an open-ended approach that allows a court to concentrate on good
socio-econon-ic results is better than a set of hard and fast rules like those of
the First Restatement that offer neutrality, ease, simplicity, certainty, and
predictability is a question that can only be answered with a value judgment.
So, too, for that matter, is the question whether a particular socio-economic
result is "good" or "bad," "just" or "unjust." The reality is that almost any
conceivable choice-of-law method can be manipulated to achieve the result
court invoked the public policy exception to refuse enforcement of the guest statutes of other
states. Id.
371. See, e.g., LEA BRILMAYER, CONFLICr OF LAWS: FOUNDATIONS AND FUTURE DI-
RECTIONS (1991); Kramer, supra note 87; Laycock, supra note 29; Sedler, supra note 106;
Singer, supra note 29.
372. See Leflar, supra note 70, at 1588; see also LvFLAR Er AL., supra note 60, at 297-
300.
373. See L. FULLER, THE MoRAirry OF LAW 39 (1964). See, e.g., Hancock, Torts Prob-
lems in Conflict of Laws Resolved by Statutory Construction: The Halley and Other Older
Cases Revisited, 18 U. TORONTO L.J. 331 (1968). Compare Rosenberg, The Comeback of
Choice-of-Law Rules, 81 COLUM. L. REv. 946 (1981).
374. The writings of Professor Joseph Singer are a notable exception to this generaliza-
tion. See Singer, supra note 29, at 74-127.
375. O.W. HOLMES, COLLECTED LEGAL PAPERS 181 (1920).
376. See id.; see also THE COMMON LAW 1 (1881). In his separate opinion in Brooks v.
Sturiano, 497 So. 2d 976 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App. 1986), Judge Hugh Glickstein made the
following remark: "In less than eloquent fashion, this writer has often described our work as
appellate judges to be, more often than not, a verbalizing of our individual value judgments,
however relative and nonabsolute they may be." Id. at 980 (Glickstein, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
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that a court wants to reach. In the end, the method is less important than the
use a court makes of it.
To make this point more concretely, I want to return to Gillen v. United
Services Automobile Ass'n,3 77 a case in which the Supreme Court of Florida,
in an opinion by Chief Justice Adkins, invoked the public policy exception
to avoid giving effect to an "other insurance" clause in an automobile
insurance policy that had originally been delivered not in Florida, but in New
Hampshire.378 The Gillens were residents of New Hampshire when they
separately insured their Karmann Ghia and Volkswagen bus with United
Services. The two policies, issued for one year, both contained uninsured
motorist coverage, and separate premiums were paid on each. Six months
after the issuance of the policies, the Gillens relocated permanently to
Florida. They notified United of the move. A month later they sold the bus
and bought a Volkswagen Squareback. United canceled the policy covering
the bus and issued a new policy on the Squareback. A month after that,
while riding in the Squareback, they were involved in a collision with an
uninsured motorist in which Mr. Gillen was killed and Mrs. Gillen seriously
injured.379
United refused to pay the combined total amount of both policies,
taking the position that the "other insurance" clause in the Karmann Ghia
policy was applicable because other similar insurance was available"
380
under the policy on the Squareback. Mrs. Gillen and the personal represen-
tative of her husband's estate brought a declaratory judgment action against
United seeking to recover under both policies. The trial court found that
"other insurance" clauses were valid and enforceable in New Hampshire but
void in Florida, because contrary to its public policy. 38' Since the Gillens
were Florida residents at the time of the accident and the cars were licensed
and garaged in Florida, all with United's knowledge, the court held the
clause invalid and awarded Mrs. Gillen and her husband's estate the com-
bined total of the coverage under both policies.82
377. 300 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1974).
378. lit at 6-7.
379. See United Services Auto. Ass'n v. Gillen, 280 So. 2d 52, 53 (Fla. 4th Dist. Ct. App.
1973).
380. See id. at 53-54. The critical language in the policy provided that "if the insured has
other similar insurance available to him and applicable to the accident, the damages shall be
deemed not to exceed the higher of the applicable limits of liability of this insurance and such
other insurance .... Id. at 53 n. 1.
381. Id. at 54.
382. See id.
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The Fourth District Court of Appeal reversed, holding that the Karmann
Ghia policy was governed by the law of New Hampshire where the policy
was issued and the insureds were living at the time.383 "The rights and
obligations of the respective parties under the contract, once entered into,
should not vary or fluctuate from state to state depending upon fortuitous
circumstances of where an accident might occur, or the arbitrary decision of
where the insured might elect to thereafter reside., 3 84 The Florida statute in
question, which the supreme court had earlier interpreted as invalidating
"other insurance" clauses, in terms applied to policies delivered or issued for
delivery in Florida.385 Hence the question confronting the supreme court
when the case reached it on certiorari was whether underwriting considera-
tions applicable to insurance contracts made in Florida could also be applied
to contracts made elsewhere, at least in a case where the principal location of
the risk had shifted to Florida during the policy term.
Lex loci contractus certainly gave an unequivocal answer: the contract
was made in New Hampshire and was valid there, and recognition of that
fact should follow everywhere. But Justice Adkins left no doubt what he
thought "justice" required in the case. He conceded United's point that
Florida's statute applied to policies delivered in Florida but rejected the
expressio unius implication that a case like this one was thereby meant to be
excluded.386 United specialized in insuring officers in the armed services, "a
rather mobile group. 387  The fact that United had been notified of the
Gillens' move to Florida and had issued a new policy on the Squareback
constituted knowledge on its part that the risks covered by the policies had
been shifted to Florida. "Yet premiums were collected on both policies by
United, who now says it is liable under only one. There is nothing in law or
equity which should aid an insurance company in so one-sided an arrange-
383. Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 54.
384. Id.
385. See Sellers v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 185 So. 2d 689, 692 (Fla.
1966). In construing section 627.0851 of the Florida Statutes, the court said that the statute
does not permit "other insurance" clauses in the policy which are contrary to the
statutorily limited amounts of coverage. It is clear that the statute does not limit
an insured only to one $10,000 recovery under said coverage where his loss for
bodily injury is greater than $10,000 and he is the beneficiary of more than one
policy issued under § 627.0851.
Id. at 692.
386. See Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 6.
387. Id. at 6.
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ment., 388 The Gillens were in the process of becoming permanent residents
of Florida. Comity, "in theory a beneficial exercise in interstate har-
mony,'389 was not a sufficient basis for ignoring their status as "proper
subjects of this Court's protection from injustice or injury." 3 °
In their effort to escape the mandate of lex loci contractus, the plaintiffs
had urged the court to apply the "most significant relationship" test of
section 188 of the Second Restatement. In light of the view he took of the
case, Justice Adkins found it unnecessary to take that step; but he then
proceeded to demonstrate how the Restatement approach would work and
with what effect. Florida, he said, had a "significant relationship" to the
case because the Gillens had become Florida residents and had given their
insurer notice to that effect; their cars were now garaged in Florida, and the
risk covered by the policy was centered there.39' In contrast, "[t]he only
relationship with New Hampshire was established during the making of the
contract. Although the place of negotiation was New Hampshire, very little
importance should be attached to this fact. The Gillens merely received a
standard form insurance policy from... [United's] main office in Texas
which was completed and returned.39 2
New Hampshire's relevant policy was "grounded in general on freedom
of contract principles ... [and its main purpose] was to provide protection
only up to the minimum statutory limits.' 3 93  Florida's statute had "no
similarly restricted purpose and, in fact, has been interpreted... to implicitly
forbid 'other insurance' clauses. 3 94 He then said that
[w]hile it is generally undesirable to unduly criticize the decisions
of a sister state, it becomes necessary to evaluate one court's posi-
tion on an issue and the reasons behind it in order to accurately as-
sess the respective states' interests. Here, the substantial interest of
Florida in protecting its citizens from the use of "other insurance"
clauses rises to a level above New Hampshire's interest in permit-
ting them. Public policy requires this Court to assert Florida's
388. Id.
389. Id.
390. Id.
391. Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 6-7.
392. Id. at 7.
393. Id.
394. Id.
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paramount interest in protecting its own from inequitable insurance
arrangements.
395
He might just as well have said that Florida's interests were those "most
deeply affected." It was really a Restatement opinion; the only difference
was the substitution of "public policy" at the end for the conclusion that
Florida was the state of "most significant relationship. 396
395. Id.
396. It is obvious, of course, that Justice Adkins did not intend this portion of his opinion
to represent a complete and authoritative exposition of the Second Restatement approach. If
he had so intended, he would undoubtedly have made mention of section 193, the specific
section dealing with contracts of casualty insurance, which calls for application of the law of
the state "which the parties understood was to be the principal location of the insured risk
during the term of the policy," subject to the usual qualification as to displacement under the
principles of section 6. See RESTATEMENT (SEcoND), supra note 144, § 193. At the time the
policy was applied for and issued, the parties certainly understood that the principal location
of the risk was New Hampshire. The comments raise the possibility that that location may
change during the policy term:
There may also be occasions when following the issuance of the policy the prin-
cipal location of the risk is shifted to some other state. In such a situation, this
other state will have a natural interest in the insurance of the risk and it may be
that its local law should be applied to determine at least some issues arising un-
der the policy. In any event, application of the local law of the other state would
hardly be unfair to the insurance company, at least with respect to some issues, if
the company had reason to foresee when it issued the policy that there might be a
shift to another state of the principal location of the risk.
Id. cmt. d. Citing two cases and an ALR annotation, the Reporter's Note following section
193 adds that "[a] shift in the principal location of the risk has been held not to affect the
applicable law in the absence of a novation." Id. at 615. The Gillen case itself is the subject
of a later ALR annotation which deals specifically with "other insurance" clauses and
concludes in the usual way that the authorities are divided on the question. See Robert A.
Brazener, Annotation, Automobile Liability Policy: Choice of Law as to Validity of "Other
Insurance" Clause of Uninsured Motorist Coverage, 83 A.L.R.3d 321, 326 (1978).
None of this helps that much in assessing what effect a shift in the principal location of the
risk should have on the validity of terms contained in the policy at the time of issuance and
delivery. Dissenting in the court below, Judge Mager thought that the "grouping of contacts"
test set forth in section 188 gave Florida a more significant relationship to the issue than New
Hampshire. See Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 56-57 (Mager, J. dissenting). This illustrates once
again what Professor Finch has aptly called the "inscrutable hold" that contact counting seems
to have on many of Florida's courts in their reading of the Second Restatement. Finch, supra
note 30, at 687. 'The phenomenon of contact counting," he continues, "usually takes the form
of a court's enumeration of the various facts that associate a dispute with particular states,
together with a summary conclusion that one state has the most 'significant relationship"' to
the issue. Id. Judge Mager's assessment of the contacts fits this description precisely:
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Gillen was a true conflict, and the opinion is a graphic example of the
kinds of subjectivity inherent in the Restatement approach when it is used as
a device for weighing interests in that kind of case. Because the Gillens had
become Florida domiciliaries, Justice Adkins plainly thought that Florida
had a strong interest in extending to them the protection of its statutory
policy prohibiting the use of "other insurance" clauses in insurance policies.
This would follow, of course, only if one accepts his unsupported assertion
that the legislature did not necessarily intend to limit the statute's application
to policies delivered or issued for delivery in Florida.397 He was perhaps a
trifle disingenuous, too, in minimizing New Hampshire's interest as he did,
an interest which stemmed from that state's desire to protect the integrity of
contracts entered into under its auspices and authority, here an insurance
contract made in New Hampshire between New Hampshire residents and an
insurer licensed to do business in the state and conditioned on New Hamp-
In the instant case, the accident occurred in Florida; at the time of the accident
the domicile of the insured was in Florida; the location of the automobile was in
Florida; and, logically, the place for the performance to have occurred was in
Florida. However, the place of negotiation as well as the place of contracting
was in New Hampshire. It would seem, under the "grouping of contacts" test,
that the State of Florida had a more significant relationship with the dispute than
the State of New Hampshire.
Gillen, 280 So. 2d at 52, 57 (Mager, J., dissenting). Actually the location of the subject matter
of the contract and the Gillens' domicile were divided between the two states. Where the
accident occurred, which Judge Mager seemed to equate with the place of performance, is
essentially irrelevant to assessing the effect of a shift in the principal location of the risk at
some point during the policy term. The accident might have occurred anywhere, either before
the Gillens' move or after it. None of this gets to the core issue, which is whether the validity
of the clause should be determined by the law of the state where the risk was principally
located at the inception of the policy or by the law of the state to which it was relocated at a
later point. By comparison, the approach sketched by Justice Adkins seems far superior.
Compare CURRM, supra note 98, at 138-40.
397. This point was obviously troubling to Justice Dekle, who concurred specially in the
result and holding only on the ground
that the insureds ... had, prior to the accident, become residents of Florida, the
vehicles were garaged here and their insurer had been so notified, thereby plac-
ing the carrier upon notice of the application of our statute ....
[O]therwise... Florida's public policy against "other insurance" clauses would
not extend to policies issued and delivered in another state, for the statute on
which Florida's public policy in this regard is founded ... is hinged upon the
predicate expressed in the statute itself as to insurance "delivered or issued for
delivery in this state with respect to any motor vehicle registered or principally
garaged in this state." Our Florida statute cannot be engrafted upon New Hamp-
shire legislation which that sovereign has seen fit to provide for its citizens.
Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 7 (Dekle, J., specially concurring).
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shire underwriting policies and requirements. Even though the Gillens had
left New Hampshire, United was a continuing presence there and was
entitled to invoke that interest in order to secure the benefit of its original
bargain.
Certainly in terms of the "justified expectations of the parties," the
Second Restatement's supreme criterion in matters of contract,398 United
arguably had a stronger claim than the Gillens. If we indulge the unlikely
assumption that they had read and understood their policies, then they would
have expected to recover at most the limits of a single policy in any accident
with an uninsured motorist. That expectation, certainly United's also, could
hardly have changed simply because they chose to move to Florida. And yet
it is precisely here that the elusive and not-to-be-controlled for element of
"justice" enters the picture. Justice Adkins knew perfectly well that there
had been no real bargaining between the parties over the terms and condi-
tions of the policy and, at least on the Gillens' part, probably even less
understanding of its provisions. As he noted, they had "merely received a
standard form insurance policy ' 399 from United which was dutifully com-
pleted and returned. Nor was it lost on him that United could reasonably
have foreseen that the Gillens, part of "a rather mobile group" 400 which the
company specialized in serving, would relocate at some point during the
policy term. They were diligent in notifying United of the move, and there
was ample opportunity for the company to rewrite the policy to conform to
Florida law and to adjust the premiums to reflect the change if it had wished
to do so.
The opinion, by a man who in my opinion was one of the truly great
judges to serve on the Supreme Court of Florida in this century, 4°' is rich in
its appreciation of the realities of life in a complex, technologically advanced
society in thrall to the automobile4°2 and utterly dependent on the insurance
398. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND), supra note 144, § 188(1) cmt. b.
399. Gillen, 300 So. 2d at 7.
400. Id. at 6.
401. See also Dedication-The Honorable James C. Adkins, Jr., 46 FLA. L. REv. vi-xi
(1994).
402. Part of the price of the car and the freedom it bestows to go where we please when
we please is the death of approximately 50,000 persons a year. In the forty-year period from
1944 to 1984 alone, 1,787,600 persons lost their lives in automobile accidents at an approxi-
mate cost of almost two trillion dollars. See Southerland, supra note 5, at 788 n.27. I am
aware of no study that has attempted to calculate what the automobile has cost this society in
gross over its approximately 90-year history, but if the direct and long-term costs of nonfatal
accidents were added in, the dollar figure would probably approach the incomprehensible. By
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industry as the only available, if never quite adequate, offset against the
catastrophic risks and hazards attendant on its use. Justice Adkins would
certainly have been the last person to deny the importance of contract or the
general societal interest in providing stability in contractual arrangements
and protecting the integrity of bargains. 403 But his strong-handed treatment
of the competing claims of the parties in this case left no doubt where he
thought the equities lay. He simply made a value judgment. And for that
purpose, as his opinion amply demonstrated, one conflict-of-laws method
was as good as another.
way of comparison, the 40-year death toll of 1,787,600 considerably exceeds the 1,177,936
persons killed in all of the major wars in which this nation has participated. See id.
403. Cf. Sturiano v. Brooks, 523 So. 2d 1126 (Fla. 1988). Unlike the Gillens, the Sturi-
anos had not come to Florida with the intention of taking up permanent residence there; they
were described as "lifelong residents of New York" who, for several years prior to their
accident, had migrated to Florida to spend the winter months. See id. at 1129. Also important
in the court's mind was the fact that they had given their insurer no notice of this practice. See
id. at 1129. See also id. at 1131 (Grimes, J., concurring).
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